Rock and Hard Place Arguments
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Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do
was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be
crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would
be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t, but if
he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was
crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to he was
sane and had to.1
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This Article explores what we coin “rock and hard place” (RHP)
arguments in the law, and it aims to motivate mission-driven plaintiffs2
to seek out such arguments in their cases.3 The RHP argument
structure helps plaintiffs win cases even when the court views that
outcome as unfavorable.
We begin by dissecting RHP dilemmas that have long existed in the
American legal system. As Part I reveals, prosecutors and law enforcement
officials have often taken advantage of RHP dilemmas and used them as a
tool to persuade criminal defendants to forfeit their constitutional rights,
confess, or give up the chance to present mitigating evidence. Part I not
only describes these dilemmas but also explains how the courts have
largely, though imperfectly, curtailed their impacts. Part II turns to civil
2. Throughout this Article, we use the term “mission-driven plaintiffs” to reference plaintiffs
represented by firms with “a social justice goal that looks beyond merely advancing the interests of
particular clients.” Private Public Interest Law and Plaintiff’s Firm Guide, HARV. L. SCH., https://
hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/private-public-interest-law-and-plaintiffs-firm-guide/ [https://perma.cc/
8E6N-5JGQ].
3. The origin of the term, of course, is the expression “(caught) between a rock and a hard place,”
which refers to a dilemma in which an actor must choose between two unfavorable options. Be
(Caught)
Between
a
Rock
and
a
Hard
Place,
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/be-caught-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place
[https://perma.cc/BG8L-9RDH].
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law. It explains how RHP dilemmas can defeat plaintiffs’ mission-driven
litigation—particularly their ability to overcome justiciability hurdles.
Part III switches gears from RHP dilemmas to RHP arguments; it
introduces the need for mission-driven plaintiffs to turn the tables by
crafting RHP dilemmas for defendants and judges. It uses logical
syllogisms and hypotheticals to introduce different RHP constructions that
plaintiffs can implement. It then provides two real-world examples of how
plaintiffs used RHP arguments to overcome jurisdictional hurdles in New
York v. Department of Labor and Natural Resources Defense Council v.
United States Department of the Interior. Part IV provides an in-depth case
study of American Anti-Vivisection Society v. United States Department
of Agriculture, a case in which mission-driven plaintiffs implemented two
simultaneous RHP arguments and thereby forced the Department of
Agriculture to implement regulations protecting birds.4 This case
highlights the efficacy of RHP arguments because the plaintiffs succeeded
after decades of failed legislative reforms and prior litigation. Part V
addresses several surprisingly liberal decisions from the Supreme Court of
the United States’ 2019 term and proposes that a unique type of RHP
argument drove the outcome in these cases. Finally, Part VI highlights
areas of the law where mission-driven plaintiffs are likely to find success
using RHP arguments and recommends future litigation strategies.
I. FROM WITCH TRIALS TO THE ELUSIVE “FAIR TRIAL”: ROCK AND
HARD PLACE DILEMMAS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
For as long as legal systems have existed, “rock and hard place”
situations have existed within them. There is perhaps no better example
than the historical practice of “trial by water” for accused witches,
prevalent in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.5 The
practice involved stripping the accused, binding her thumbs to her toes,
and throwing her into a body of water to “test” whether she was a witch.6
If she floated, she would be deemed a witch, removed from the water, and
executed, often by burning.7 If she sank, she would be deemed innocent,

4. Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 946 F.3d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
5. Russell Zguta, The Ordeal By Water (Swimming of Witches) in the East Slavic World, 36
SLAVIC REV. 220, 221–22, 224 (1977).
6. Id. at 221. The idea was that “water, the pure and cleansing element, the instrument of baptism,
would refuse to receive those tainted with crime.” Id. (citing HENRY CHARLES LEA, SUPERSTITION
AND FORCE: TORTURE, ORDEAL, AND TRIAL BY COMBAT IN MEDIEVAL LAW 247 (Barnes & Noble
1996) (1870))).
7. Id. at 221–22.
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but would suffer permanent health consequences from being submerged—
or even die from drowning—unless she was pulled up in time.8
Following in the footsteps of witch trial arbiters (albeit more subtly),
American law enforcement officers and prosecutors have, throughout
history, pressed suspects and criminal defendants into various RHP
dilemmas. Some noteworthy examples are dilemmas that (1) force
a defendant to forfeit a constitutional right, (2) coerce a suspect into
confessing to a crime, or (3) force a defendant to forgo the chance to
present mitigating evidence at a death penalty proceeding.
Over time, courts developed rules that eliminated many of these dilemmas.
Even so, courts and legislators have allowed some unfortunate RHP
dilemmas to persist.
A. Dilemmas that Force a Defendant to Forfeit a Constitutional Right
Before the Supreme Court intervened, RHP dilemmas often forced
defendants to forfeit established constitutional rights such as the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy or the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable
searches and seizures”; the government cannot search or confiscate a
suspect’s property without adequate justification and, in many cases, a
warrant.9 If the government obtains evidence through a search or seizure
that violated a criminal defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, the
defendant can file a motion to “suppress the evidence,” meaning the
government cannot use the evidence against the defendant at trial.10 The
Fifth Amendment prevents the government from forcing witnesses to give
8. In at least some cases, ropes would be tied around the waists of the accused so that they could
be pulled out of the water if they proved themselves “innocent” by sinking. Id. at 221; Dhwty, Trial
By Ordeal: A Life or Death Method of Judgement, ANCIENT ORIGINS (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.ancient-origins.net/history/trial-ordeal-life-or-death-method-judgement-004160
[https://perma.cc/Q2FA-DYXY]. However, women still died or suffered severe health consequences
from spending time submerged in water. Zguta, supra note 5, at 228 (“One of the victims of the
Dzhurkovo [trial by water] suffered permanent loss of hearing while several others fell seriously ill as
a result of the ordeal.”); Dhwty, supra (noting that “accidental drowning deaths did occur”).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310 (2015) (“The Fourth
Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. The reasonableness of a search depends on the
totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which
the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.”); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative
Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1644 (1998) (“More
typically (and formalistically) . . . the Court considers the legality of a search to turn exclusively on
whether there is a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that evidence of a criminal offense
is present in a given location.”).
10. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397–98 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), and overruled in part by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (holding that
in a federal prosecution, the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal
search and seizure); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 678 (holding that the Weeks exclusionary rule also applies in
state prosecutions).
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testimony that could be used to convict them of a crime.11 Two main
implications of this are that (1) criminal defendants have the right not to
testify during the trial on their guilt or innocence and (2) all witnesses have
the right to refuse to answer self-incriminating questions in any court
proceeding, unless they are promised that the testimony will not be used
as evidence against them in a criminal trial.12
1. The First Dilemma: Admit to Ownership of Illegally Seized Evidence
and Waive the Fifth Amendment, or Allow the Prosecution to Use the
Illegally Seized Evidence and Surrender a Fourth Amendment Claim
Despite the clear constitutional commands, criminal defendants were
once caught between the rock of forfeiting their Fourth Amendment rights
and the hard place of giving up their Fifth Amendment privilege when
deciding whether to file a motion to suppress evidence. This dilemma was
especially acute for defendants charged with possessory crimes.13 When
possession of contraband (such as drugs) is an essential element of a crime,
the government often seeks to prove its case by introducing seized
contraband into evidence and explaining where it was found, thereby
connecting the contraband to the defendant.14 If the government seized the
contraband during a search that violated the Fourth Amendment, the
defendant might wish to file a motion to suppress to exclude the critical
evidence.15 Importantly, a defendant cannot succeed on his suppression

11. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (“The Amendment
not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a
criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future
criminal proceedings.”). If the state wishes to make a witness to testify (outside the presence of a jury
deciding his own guilt or innocence), it can do so without violating the Fifth Amendment if it grants
the testifying witness “use and derivative use” immunity, meaning that neither the testimony nor
evidence derived from it can be admitted as evidence against him in any trial on his own guilt or
innocence. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). Another option is for the state to grant
the witness “transactional immunity,” a broader protection “which accords full immunity from
prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates.” Id.
12. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453–54.
13. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83 (1980).
14. E.g., id. at 258–59 (the government obtained narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia through
a search and sought to introduce this evidence and connect it to the defendant to prove possession of
narcotics); Defendant’s Motion to Suppress & Dismiss Charges at 2, State v. Huynh, No. DC-201798 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 2018) (the State charged the defendant with possession of dangerous drugs with
intent to distribute, basing its case on drugs found in the defendant’s rental car during a police search).
15. E.g., Jones, 362 U.S. at 259 (“Prior to trial petitioner duly moved to suppress the evidence
obtained through the execution of the search warrant on the ground that the warrant had been issued
without a showing of probable cause.”); Defendant’s Motion to Suppress & Dismiss Charges, supra
note 14.
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motion unless he demonstrates that he has “standing”16 to file the
motion—and he cannot establish standing unless he proves that he has an
ownership interest in the premises searched or in the seized contraband.17
In 1960, when Jones v. United States was decided, if a defendant
made any statements in support of his motion to suppress, the government
could use the statements as evidence against him during trial.18 The
defendant thus faced an RHP dilemma. Testifying that he had an
ownership interest in the premises would bolster the government’s case by
enabling the prosecutor to say, “The defendant admitted to owning the
place where the police found the contraband.” Testifying that he owned
the seized contraband would be even worse—it would be equivalent to
proving his own guilt of possession.19 In other words, the defendant could
not offer any explanation for why he had Fourth Amendment standing
without incriminating himself and thus forfeiting his Fifth Amendment
privilege. But if the defendant failed to testify that he had Fourth
Amendment standing, he would allow the prosecutor to use unlawfully
seized evidence to secure his conviction.
Recognizing that courts were “pinion[ing]” defendants with this
“dilemma,”20 the Supreme Court in Jones provided the first solution21:
automatic Fourth Amendment standing.22 The Court found that
“[t]he same element in this prosecution which has caused a dilemma, i[.e].,
that possession both convicts and confers standing, eliminates any
necessity for a preliminary showing of an interest in the premises searched
or the property seized, which ordinarily is required when standing
is challenged.”23 In other words, under Jones, a defendant charged with
a possessory crime automatically had standing to file a motion to suppress
evidence of possession.24 He therefore had the opportunity to keep
16. “Fourth Amendment standing is another way of saying that the person who wants to
complain about a Fourth Amendment violation is the one (or among those) whose own Fourth
Amendment rights were violated.” Sherry F. Colb, Rental Cars, Privacy, and Suppression of Evidence,
JUSTIA: VERDICT (June 20, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/06/20/rental-cars-privacy-andsuppression-of-evidence [https://perma.cc/2GV6-BWF4].
17. Jones, 362 U.S. at 261.
18. Id. at 262.
19. Id. at 261–62.
20. Id. at 262.
21. As discussed infra, the Court overruled Jones when its later cases provided an alternative
solution to the RHP dilemma of choosing between the waiver of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
22. Jones, 362 U.S. at 263–64; Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 391 (1968) (“We
eliminated that Hobson’s choice in Jones v. United States . . . by relaxing the standing requirements.”).
“Hobson’s choice” is another term used for an RHP dilemma. See Hobson’s Choice, BALLENTINE’S
LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
23. Jones, 362 U.S. at 263.
24. Darlene Stosik, The Death Knell of Automatic Standing—Another Blow to Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 35 U. MIA. L. REV. 361, 362 (1981). Jones also had an alternative holding. See
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the evidence out without having to incriminate himself by
claiming ownership.
A later Supreme Court case, Simmons v. United States, provided an
alternative solution to the RHP dilemma that defendants face when
seeking to suppress illegally seized evidence—a solution that extended
even to non-possessory cases. The Simmons defendants faced charges for
armed robbery of a bank.25 The government sought to introduce a suitcase
containing money wrappers from the victimized bank into evidence
against one of the defendants, Garrett.26 Garrett filed a Fourth Amendment
motion to suppress the evidence.27 Because the Jones automatic-standing
rule did not apply to defendants charged with non-possessory crimes such
as armed robbery, Garrett testified that he owned the suitcase to
demonstrate that he had standing to file the motion.28
The Supreme Court found that “[t]estimony of this kind, which links
a defendant to evidence which the Government considers important
enough to seize and to seek to have admitted at trial, must often be highly
prejudicial to a defendant.”29 In other words, the Simmons Court
recognized that defendants charged with any crime face an RHP dilemma
if their options are to either (1) allow incriminating, unconstitutionally
seized evidence in or (2) testify that they own incriminating evidence or a
place where incriminating evidence was found, when that testimony could
itself be used as evidence against them.30 The Court recognized that Option
One required defendants to give up their right to raise a Fourth
Amendment claim, while Option Two required defendants to give up their
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.31 Finding “it
intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in
order to assert another,” Simmons fashioned an effective new solution
extending to all defendants.32 Appearing to rest its decision on one or both
of the two amendments at issue,33 the Court held that when defendants
Jones, 362 U.S. at 265 (“As a second ground sustaining ‘standing’ here we hold that petitioner’s
testimony on the motion to suppress made out a sufficient interest in the premises to establish him as
a ‘person aggrieved’ by their search.”).
25. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 379.
26. Id. at 391.
27. Id. at 382.
28. See id. at 391.
29. Id.
30. Cf. id. at 393 (“In such circumstances, a defendant with a substantial claim for the exclusion
of evidence may conclude that the admission of the evidence, together with the Government’s proof
linking it to him, is preferable to risking the admission of his own testimony connecting himself with
the seized evidence.”).
31. Id. at 393–94.
32. Id. at 394.
33. The Court did not explicitly state what the constitutional ground for its decision was (i.e.,
what constitutional provision mandated the decision the Court reached), but it discussed each
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testify to establish Fourth Amendment standing, their testimony
is not admissible against them on the question of guilt.34 Thus, under
Simmons, defendants no longer have to worry that they will incriminate
themselves by alleging that they meet Fourth Amendment standing
requirements; they no longer have to surrender the Fifth to claim the
advantages of the Fourth.35
In 1980, United States v. Salvucci concluded this saga. Salvucci
acknowledged that Simmons effectively eliminated “[t]he ‘dilemma’
identified in Jones.”36 With this RHP dilemma resolved, the Court found
that “the cornerstone of the Jones opinion” no longer existed, and the need
for the Jones automatic-standing rule disappeared.37 Salvucci thus
reaffirmed what Jones and Simmons already made clear: Supreme Court
decisions can turn on whether an RHP dilemma leaves defendants unable
to assert one right without relinquishing another,38 even though the
Constitution does not expressly prohibit such dilemmas.39
Amendment and the undesirability of forcing a defendant to choose between one constitutional
protection and another. Id. at 392–94; cf. Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One
Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741, 761 n.59 (1981) (“[A]lthough
we may have difficulty knowing which of the two constitutional grounds supports the judgment (if not
both), we know for certain that the compelled election in Simmons was unconstitutional under either
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the fourth amendment, if not under both.”).
34. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394.
35. The holding in Simmons effectively clothed defendants’ testimony during Fourth
Amendment suppression hearings with “use and derivative use” immunity, meaning that defendants
would not waive their Fifth Amendment privilege by testifying in support of a suppression motion
because their testimony could not be used against them on the issue of guilt or innocence. See supra
note 11 for further explanation of “use and derivative use” immunity and how it relates to the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
36. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 89 (1980).
37. Id. at 90. The Court also found that the second rationale of Jones had been undercut by recent
decisions. Id.
38. In the aftermath of Simmons, the Supreme Court and lower courts have made other decisions
on the basis of the same rationale: that no person should be forced to choose between two constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807–08 (1977) (“Section 22 is coercive for
yet another reason: It requires appellee to forfeit one constitutionally protected right as the price for
exercising another.” (citing Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394))). However, as Peter Westen discusses in his
article Incredible Dilemmas, the Court sometimes dismisses the Simmons argument and refrains from
intervening when a person is faced with forfeiting one constitutional right or the other. Westen, supra
note 33, at 743 (“When the Court is willing to allow constitutional rights to be so conditioned, it
dismisses Simmons with the observation that the ‘legal system is replete with situations requiring “the
making of difficult [choices].”’”). Thus, the Court has not had an entirely consistent approach to
dealing with the type of RHP dilemma addressed in Simmons and discussed in this subsection. See id.
39. See generally U.S. CONST. See also Westen, supra note 33, at 758 (“Contrary to a suggestion
that is sometimes made, the mere ‘juxtaposition’ of two constitutional rights does not itself create a
constitutional issue: the so-called ‘tension’ between two constitutional rights is not itself a
constitutional problem apart from the effect of the compelled election on the two respective rights.”).
Because of this, Westen argues that if the forced choice between two constitutional rights (compelled
election) “violates the constitutional ‘policies’ underlying one or more of the two rights, the election
is invalid for that reason alone; if, on the other hand, the compelled election does not violate either of
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2. The Second Dilemma: Testify and Forfeit the Fifth Amendment
Privilege, or Allow the Jury to Infer Guilt
Criminal defendants also face a second important RHP dilemma with
respect to exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. At every criminal trial, the defendant confronts this
dilemma when deciding whether to testify: he either must (1) forfeit his
Fifth Amendment privilege and take the stand or (2) remain silent, inviting
jurors to think, “If he is really innocent, why doesn’t he just tell us that?”40
If he chooses Option One, he not only forfeits a constitutional right but
also risks hurting his case during his testimony, even if he is innocent. An
innocent defendant might be a nervous speaker who would have a hard
time telling his story persuasively, especially to a jury that he knows is
judging his every word.41 He might simply be no match for a savvy
prosecutor who could easily trip him up on cross-examination42 or
prejudice the jury against him by asking him about his prior convictions.43
But if he chooses Option Two, he takes on the burden of overcoming many
the two rights, the Constitution can have nothing more to say about it.” Id. (footnote omitted). In
Westen’s view, then, when a defendant is forced to choose between two rights, rather than
automatically viewing that situation as an unconstitutional RHP dilemma (as the Court seems to
suggest in Simmons), the Court should conduct two separate analyses: (1) whether the pressure the
dilemma places on a defendant violates the policies and interests underlying Constitutional Right #1,
and (2) whether the pressure the dilemma places on a defendant violates the policies and interests
underlying Constitutional Right #2. Id. at 759. In conducting these analyses, the Court (according to
Westen) should make “particularized assessments” of how the dilemma both benefits the state and
burdens each relevant constitutional right. Id. We do not attempt to argue for the wisdom of the
Simmons approach over Westen’s approach (or vice versa) but simply observe that the Supreme Court
has been persuaded to act based on the mere existence of an RHP choice between waiving one
constitutional right or the other. Westen recognizes as much and admits that the “rock and whirlpool,”
“Hobson’s choice,” and “dilemma” language used in Simmons has strong persuasive appeal and has
continued to be used successfully in litigation. Id. at 762, 741 n.14.
40. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 426 (2018) (“The data also
suggest that juries punish defendants for remaining silent at trial with a ‘silence penalty.’”); John H.
Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons from the Wrongfully
Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 478 (2008) (“Most people think: ‘If it were me, and I
were charged with a crime I did not commit, I would put my hand on the Bible, get up on that witness
stand, look those jurors dead in the eye, and tell them that I didn’t do it. Only guilty people don’t
testify.’”).
41. See GERRY SPENCE, WIN YOUR CASE 212 (2005) (“Innocent defendants are most often
helpless to defend themselves—their fear, their anger at being charged with a crime they did not
commit, their inability to match wits with a seasoned prosecutor makes it almost impossible for the
defendant to take the stand and convince the jury of his innocence.”).
42. Id. at 141 (“When a skillfully prepared cross-examination is complete[,] the prosecutor will
often leave the most innocent appearing to be guilty—a murderer, a thief, a two-bit fraud, and a
dastardly liar, which, in the hierarchy of all crime, and to many jurors, is the worst crime of all, since
we have been taught that only the guilty lie.”).
43. See Bellin, supra note 40, at 398 (describing how, by testifying, a defendant opens the door
to the government introducing evidence of his prior crimes on cross-examination, which makes the
jury “more likely to convict”).
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jurors’ presumption that silence equates to guilt. His attorney can explain
to the jury that an innocent defendant might not want to testify for many
reasons,44 but no matter what the attorney says, some jurors may still think
the defendant would have taken the stand if he had a true story of
innocence to tell.45
While the Supreme Court cannot entirely resolve this dilemma,46 the
Court has at least prevented prosecutors from exploiting it by holding that
the government cannot encourage the jury to equate silence with guilt. In
Griffin v. California, the defendant chose not to testify at the trial on his
guilt or innocence, claiming the protections of the Fifth Amendment.47
During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly
commented on the defendant’s silence, suggesting to the jury that if the
defendant had an innocent explanation for the evidence against him, he
would have taken the stand.48 The Court found that “comment on the
refusal to testify” “is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege” that “cuts down on the privilege by making its
assertion costly,” violating the Fifth Amendment.49 By holding that
imposing a costly penalty on the exercise of a constitutional right violates
the Constitution, the Court again expressed the view that the government
should not use RHP dilemmas to pressure defendants to forfeit their rights.

44. Many defense attorneys use voir dire or closing statements to address this issue. E.g., Jeffery
P. Robinson, Sacrifice Control to Learn What Jurors Really Think, in NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF.
LAWS., HIGH ALTITUDE TRIAL SKILLS FROM THE MASTERS OF ADVOCACY 1, 10 (2015) (including the
following sample voir dire question: “If some people on the jury may think that a person who testifies
can’t be trusted because their freedom is on the line, and others think that if a person doesn’t testify
they are hiding something, how does an innocent person resolve that conflict? Have you ever heard
the expression ‘between a rock and a hard place?’”); SPENCE, supra note 41, at 185 (providing a
sample portion of a closing argument addressing this issue: “[The defendant] is not skilled in dealing
with the likes of Mr. Prosecutor over there, who would love to bombard him with those clever
questions that can confuse and confound and make the most innocent person look guilty. How could
[the defendant], with an eighth-grade education, ever compete with this prosecutor who is skilled in
this business of cross-examination? It’s for these reasons that our founders have protected us [with the
Fifth Amendment]. I have decided as his lawyer that it is best for Jimmy to let me speak for him as
best I can”). See supra notes 41, 42, and 43 for sources discussing the reasons a defendant might not
want to testify, aside from guilt.
45. Bellin, supra note 40, at 426.
46. As the text accompanying supra note 44 suggests, it is impossible to fully prevent jurors
from thinking, “If he were innocent, he would talk.” Thus, no matter what solution the court devises,
defendants will face a dilemma when choosing whether to testify.
47. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 609–10 (1965).
48. Id. at 610–11.
49. Id. at 614. The decision also, similarly, held that the court could not instruct the jury that the
defendant’s silence could be used as evidence against him. Id. at 615.
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B. Dilemmas that Coerce Confessions
Government officials have used RHP dilemmas not only to pressure
defendants into forfeiting their constitutional rights but also to elicit
confessions.50 During the most egregious interrogations, detectives have
forced suspects to choose between the rock of confessing and the hard
place of physical torture.51 Other detectives have elicited confessions by
warning that suspects will face violence from third parties if they do not
confess.52 Still others have convinced suspects to confess by suggesting
that if they remain silent, they will face a longer prison sentence53

50. Forcing a suspect to confess during interrogation could be seen as forcing the suspect to
forfeit his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, provided that the suspect was not
granted immunity. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies in custodial interrogations); Mark
A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 491 (2005) (arguing that courts should use the
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause to regulate the methods used to elicit confessions
“because [the Clause] unambiguously speaks to the issue by banning the use of compulsion to obtain
self-incriminating statements that are later admitted at trial against the suspect”). However,
confessions have long been governed by “voluntariness” doctrines—first, the common law
voluntariness doctrine, and later, the Due Process voluntariness doctrine—that are not rooted in the
Self-Incrimination Clause. Cf. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985) (“Indeed, even after holding
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies in the context of
custodial interrogations [in] Miranda[,] . . . the Court has continued to measure confessions against
the requirements of due process.”). See generally Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The
Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 99 (1989)
(discussing development of the common law voluntariness doctrine and Due Process voluntariness
doctrine). These doctrines are based not on the idea that the government should not force the waiver
of a constitutional right, but on the idea that inducing confessions through RHP dilemmas is
problematic for other reasons: such confessions are unreliable, and eliciting them is unfair. See infra
Section I.B. It is for this reason that we discuss dilemmas coercing confessions separately from
dilemmas forcing the forfeiture of a constitutional right.
51. E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 282 (1936) (“[T]he two last named defendants
were made to strip and they were laid over chairs and their backs were cut to pieces with a leather
strap with buckles on it, and they were likewise made by the said deputy definitely to understand that
the whipping would be continued unless and until they confessed . . . .”).
52. E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564 (1958) (the defendant “testified, concerning the
conduct that immediately induced his confession, as follows: ‘I was locked up upstairs and [the
detective] . . . told me that I had not told him all of the story—he said that there was 30 or 40 people
outside that wanted to get me, and he said if I would come in and tell him the truth that he would
probably keep them from coming in’”).
53. E.g., Wyatt Kozinski, Comment, The Reid Interrogation Technique and False Confessions:
A Time for Change, 16 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 301, 312 (2017) (describing how interrogators
commonly use a method known as the Reid Technique to make suspects believe they will receive a
longer sentence if they refuse to confess, inter alia).
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or the death penalty;54 have their kids taken away;55 lose their job;56
or undergo endless, incommunicado detention, perhaps without adequate
food and water.57
In all these examples, the overall strategy of the interrogator is to
make the accused believe that confessing is the lesser of two perils. This
strategy is very effective—so effective that it can lead people to confess
to crimes they did not even commit58 because innocent suspects, just like
guilty suspects, often decide whether to confess by “consciously or
unconsciously” weighing the costs and benefits of their options.59 If
interrogators paint a picture of a hard place that seems more costly than
confessing, it makes sense for the (often scared and overwhelmed)
innocent suspect to confess.60 This can be true even when, objectively
54. E.g., Lauren Morehouse, Confess or Die: Why Threatening a Suspect with the Death Penalty
Should Render Confessions Involuntary, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 531, 532 (discussing the Norfolk Four
case, in which four men falsely confessed to the rape and murder of a young woman because the police
“threatened the men with the death penalty during the interrogations[, and] told them that the only way
to avoid the death penalty was to confess”).
55. E.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (“It is thus abundantly clear that the
petitioner’s oral confession was made only after the police had told her that state financial aid for her
infant children would be cut off, and her children taken from her, if she did not ‘cooperate.’”).
56. E.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 494 (the defendants, who worked as police
officers, confessed after they were told that if they “refused to answer [they] would be subject to
removal from office”).
57. E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (“The petitioner at first resisted
making a written statement and gave in only after consistent denials of his requests to call his wife,
and the conditioning of such outside contact upon his accession to police demands. Confronted with
the express threat of continued incommunicado detention and induced by the promise of
communication with and access to family Haynes understandably chose to make and sign the damning
written statement.”); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441 (1961) (the accused “was, for all practical
purposes, held incommunicado,” without access to his friends and family or adequate food or water,
until he finally confessed).
58. Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and
Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 986 (1997) (“Investigators elicit the decision to confess
from the innocent in one of two ways: either by leading them to believe that their situation, though
unjust, is hopeless and will only be improved by confessing; or by persuading them that they probably
committed a crime about which they have no memory and that confessing is the proper and optimal
course of action.” (emphasis added)). According to Ofshe and Leo, the techniques used by
interrogators to elicit confessions “work[] effectively by controlling the alternatives a person considers
and by influencing how these alternatives are understood.” Id. at 985. In essence, they make even the
innocent suspect believe that the rock of confessing is better than the hard place of the punishment the
suspect will experience if he refuses to confess. See also False Confessions Happen More Than We
Think, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 14, 2011), https://www.innocenceproject.org/false-confessionshappen-more-than-we-think/ [https://perma.cc/ZNA2-SUH4] (“In approximately 25% of the wrongful
convictions overturned with DNA evidence, defendants made false confessions, admissions or
statements to law enforcement officials.”).
59. Alan Hirsch, Threats, Promises, and False Confessions: Lessons of Slavery, 49 HOW. L.J.
31, 35–36 (2005).
60. Id. A famous example of this is the “Central Park Five” case. Evan Nesterak, Coerced to
Confess: The Psychology of False Confessions, BEHAV. SCIENTIST (Oct. 21, 2014),
https://behavioralscientist.org/coerced-to-confess-the-psychology-of-false-confessions
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speaking, the hard place is actually less costly than confessing. For
example, confessing when innocent is almost certainly more costly than
having to spend an hour alone with a detective in an interrogation room,
but a frightened child might see an hour of incommunicado interrogation,
separated from their family, as the worst imaginable situation. Thus, when
the government uses any RHP dilemma to corner a suspect into
confessing, the confession has questionable value as evidence—it could
mean that the suspect is guilty, but it could also mean that the suspect
simply thought confessing was the easiest way out of the dilemma, in spite
of his innocence.61
Early U.S. courts recognized that such confessions are unreliable and
refused to admit them into evidence under the common law voluntariness
doctrine.62 This doctrine was an evidentiary rule that trial courts applied to
exclude any confession that the government63 “induced . . . by a promise
or threat.”64 The rule applied even when the government only implied the
promise or threat; any tactic inducing hope or fear would generally render
a confession inadmissible.65 Thus, the rule accounted for the two main
[https://perma.cc/96Y8-CJCC]; see also When They See Us, NETFLIX (May 13, 2019) (miniseries
based on the “Central Park Five” and their false confessions). Five New York teenage boys each
confessed to involvement in the brutal rape of a jogger in Central Park and implicated one another,
even though none of the boys were actually involved in the rape. Nesterak, supra. Each boy
experienced “14–30 hours of interrogation under tremendous pressure” and was “[led] to believe that
he would get to go home if he confessed.” Id.
61. See supra notes 58 and 60. Of course, there are some cases where such a confession is
corroborated by outside evidence, mediating concerns about reliability. For example, if the suspect
confesses to stabbing the victim to death and explains where the detectives can find the knife, the
detectives find a knife at the described location, and forensic analysis shows that the knife was the one
used in the crime, there is little reason to doubt the veracity of the suspect’s confession.
62. Benner, supra note 50, at 93–94 (observing that “the concern with ‘voluntariness’ stemmed
from the recognition that a tortured confession might be false” and “reflected a concern with the
reliability of such a confession”).
63. The rule was also often applied when the promises or threats were made by third parties (not
the government) because the courts recognized that the same reliability concerns are present regardless
of who performs the questioning. Godsey, supra note 50, at 482.
64. United States v. Charles, 25 F. Cas. 409, 410 (C.C.D.C. 1813) (finding confession
“induced . . . by a promise or threat” and subsequent confession “of the same, or like facts”
inadmissible); Benner, supra note 50, at 99; see THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 43 (Abraham Small 5th ed. 1824) (1804) (“[B]ut if any threats or promises have been made
to induce [the defendant] to confess, no evidence of such confession is admitted[.]”); Wilson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896) (stating in dicta the common law rule that confessions “are
inadmissible if made under any threat, promise, or encouragement of any hope or favor”).
65. See, e.g., State v. Drake, 18 S.E. 166, 166 (N.C. 1893) (holding confession inadmissible
when an officer told the defendant, “If you are guilty, I would advise you to make an honest confession.
It might be easier for you. It is plain against you,” because “[t]here was in what was then said to the
prisoner a hope held out to him that a confession would make his punishment the lighter, and
confessions thus induced by hope ‘are, of all kinds of evidence, the least to be relied on, and are
therefore to be entirely rejected’” (citation omitted)); Charles, 25 F. Cas. at 410 (finding confession
inadmissible when it “had been made under the impression of fear and hope excited by the
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ways that interrogators manipulate RHP dilemmas to elicit confessions.
First, it accounted for interrogators’ use of direct threats: telling suspects
that they will face a hard place—e.g., torture, a harsh sentence, or endless
interrogation—if they do not confess.66 Second, it accounted for
interrogators’ use of the more subtle approach of making suspects believe
that they will likely be convicted if they do not confess and then implying
that they might receive leniency or understanding if they confess.67
This approach makes the suspect believe the rock of confessing is better
than the hard place of likely being convicted without confessing. When
interrogators cannot use express or implied threats or promises, they can
employ neither of these interrogation strategies. Thus, by removing these
tools from the interrogator’s toolbox, early courts largely prevented
the government from using RHP dilemmas to elicit confessions68 (at least
on the record69).
Eventually, the Supreme Court constitutionalized the voluntariness
doctrine70 and, in subsequent cases, gradually began to change its focus
and scope. In Bram v. United States,71 the Court controversially held that
observations of the magistrate”); State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 259, 261 (1827) (“[Confessions]
are called voluntary, when made neither under the influence of hope or fear, but are attributable to that
love of truth which predominates in the breast of every man . . . .”).
66. See Benner, supra note 50, at 98–99 (discussing how the common law voluntariness doctrine
incorporated “the Gilbert rule (confessions extorted by pain and force are not dependable)”).
67. The facts of the 1813 case United States v. Charles provide an illustration of this. In Charles,
a magistrate “told [the accused] there was evidence enough to commit him at all events, and therefore
he had better confess the who[l]e truth, and that probably he would fare the better for it.” 25 F. Cas. at
409. He thus made the accused believe that he had a choice between (A) the rock of confessing and
(possibly) being convicted but receiving leniency and (B) a worse hard place of being convicted and
receiving no leniency because of his refusal to own up to his “guilt.” See id. The accused chose the
rock of confessing, likely to avoid the even less desirable hard place. See id. at 410. For other
examples, see Reg. v. Croydon, 2 Cox C.C. 67 (1846) (finding confession inadmissible when the
suspect was told, “I dare say you had a hand in it. You may as well tell me all about it”); Rex v.
Thomas, 6 C. & P. 353 (1833) (finding confession inadmissible when the suspect was told, “You had
better split, and not suffer for all of them,” suggesting he would be found guilty and receive a greater
sentence if he did not confess and implicate co-conspirators); see also Green v. State, 15 S.E. 10, 10
(Ga. 1891) (rebuking interrogators for misleading suspects about the consequences of confessing
versus the consequences of remaining silent—“It is a gross and inexcusable abuse of authority on the
part of men occupying official positions, or assuming to act officially, to thus take advantage of the
helplessness or ignorance of persons charged with crime . . . .”).
68. See Benner, supra note 50, at 106 (“As the commentators of that period asserted, even the
slightest influence of hope or fear operated to render a confession inadmissible.”).
69. See Kozinski, supra note 53, at 306−07 (describing how, prior to the 1930s, law enforcement
officers often used off-the-record third-degree tactics that would not leave a physical mark, since
recording equipment did not exist).
70. Godsey, supra note 50, at 477 n.60; see George E. Dix, Promises, Confessions, and Wayne
Lafave’s Bright Line Rule Analysis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 207, 207, 213 (1993) (describing how “in
Bram, the Court read the Fifth Amendment as embodying the common-law voluntariness rule” and
constitutionalized a bright-line “prohibition against the use of ‘promises’ to induce a confession”).
71. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 534 (1897).
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the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause required voluntariness,
“equating the ‘compulsion’ proscribed by the [F]ifth [A]mendment
with the English common law voluntariness test.”72 However, the
Fifth Amendment voluntariness doctrine did not limit the admissibility
of confessions in state court because, at the time of Bram and
through the mid-1960s, the Fifth Amendment only applied to the
federal government.73
Because of this, starting in 1936 with Brown v. Mississippi, the
Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to develop a separate doctrine limiting the admissibility of
confessions in state courts.74 Unlike the common law voluntariness
doctrine, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process voluntariness doctrine
is based primarily on concerns about fundamental fairness rather than
reliability.75 Early Fourteenth Amendment voluntariness decisions like
Brown were concerned with the imposition of especially egregious hard
places that are “revolting to the sense of justice,” such as physical torture.76
As the doctrine evolved, it became focused on whether a “defendant’s will
was overborne at the time he confessed”77 and recognized that many
different types of “coercive police conduct”78 can lead to an involuntary
confession. Even after the Supreme Court incorporated the Fifth
Amendment against the states,79 the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
72. Benner, supra note 50, at 107; see Godsey, supra note 50, at 478 (“Rather than examine the
text [of the Fifth Amendment], the Court [in Bram] simply borrowed the voluntariness test from a line
of early English and American common law cases and used it in place of the compulsion paradigm
textually delineated within the self-incrimination clause. . . . confus[ing] two distinct confession
doctrines . . . .”); Bram, 168 U.S. at 542.
73. Godsey, supra note 40, at 488.
74. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (holding that the state violated the Due
Process Clause by eliciting confessions from three defendants through torture).
75. E.g., id. at 286 (“The due process clause requires ‘that state action, whether through one
agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions.’” (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926))); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“The aim of the requirement of due process
is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of
evidence whether true or false.”).
76. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. In Brown, one of the defendants was hung from a tree and severely
whipped until he confessed, and the other two defendants were stripped and severely whipped until
they confessed. Id. at 282.
77. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973).
78. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986).
79. In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964), the Supreme Court incorporated the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause against the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment—the same clause forming the basis of the Due Process voluntariness doctrine.
As this could generate some confusion, it is important to note that the Due Process doctrine that
governed (and continues to govern) confessions in state courts is not merely the Bram Fifth
Amendment voluntariness test applied to states, but it is an independent doctrine that is not rooted in
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voluntariness doctrine continued to govern the admissibility of
confessions in state courts,80 and the Court developed an analog (based on
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment81) that supplanted the
Bram doctrine to govern confessions in federal courts.82 This Article, in
the tradition of other scholarship, refers to the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process voluntariness doctrine and the identical Fifth Amendment Due
Process voluntariness doctrine cumulatively as the “Due Process
voluntariness doctrine.”83
The shift away from the Bram/common-law voluntariness test to the
Due Process voluntariness test was significant because it meant that the
manipulation of RHP dilemmas through threats and promises was no
longer per se impermissible.84 To determine whether a “defendant’s will
the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause and predated the incorporation of the Fifth
Amendment. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 534 (1897).
80. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163 (“The Court has retained this due process focus, even after holding,
in Malloy v. Hogan, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies
to the States.” (citation omitted)); see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985) (“Indeed, even
after holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies in the
context of custodial interrogations [in] Miranda v. Arizona, and is binding on the States, [in] Malloy
v. Hogan, the Court has continued to measure confessions against the requirements of due process.”
(citation omitted)). In Miranda, the Court had suggested a return to using the Fifth Amendment
Self-Incrimination Clause to govern the admissibility of confessions, issuing a prophylactic rule to
protect a suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogations. Godsey, supra
note 50, at 499−501. Under this prophylactic rule, a confession elicited during custodial interrogation
is inadmissible unless the interrogator reads “Miranda warnings” to a suspect, and the suspect
subsequently waives his “Miranda rights,” including his right to remain silent. Id. at 501. However,
many suspects are read the warnings and waive their rights; the confessions of these suspects are then
governed under the Due Process voluntariness standard. Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to
Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1218 (2001). The Due Process
doctrine thus continues to dominate the admissibility of confessions. See Godsey, supra note 50, at
508 (“What we are left with at the foundation of confession law is a return to the basic rule of decades
past that involuntary confessions are inadmissible under notions of due process.”).
81. As distinct from the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which Bram had
relied on.
82. Godsey, supra note 50, at 489 (“After creating this due process involuntary confession rule,
the Supreme Court began using it to suppress involuntary confessions not only in state cases but in
federal cases as well. The Court relied on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in state
cases and the nearly identical due process clause of the Fifth Amendment in federal cases.”); see also
discussion in supra note 80.
83. See generally Godsey, supra note 50, at 489 (using the term “due process involuntary
confession rule” throughout to refer to the rule applied under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause and under the identical Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
84. Cf. id. at 490 (describing how the Due Process voluntariness rule is more “police-friendly”
than the Bram/common-law rule because “the involuntary confession rule became more subjective
than it had been under Bram”). Godsey observes how the elimination of Bram’s per se prohibitions on
threats and promises allows law enforcement officers to use more interrogation tactics:
In Bram, the Court had stated that “[t]he law cannot measure the force of the influence
used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and, therefore excludes the
declaration if any degree of influence has been exerted.” During the due process era,
however, the Court ignored its own warnings from an earlier era and boldly ventured into
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was overborne” by police questioning, courts applying the Due Process
voluntariness test attempt to ascertain whether the suspect actually felt
forced to confess, engaging in a subjective totality of the circumstances
inquiry.85 The Supreme Court has found certain tactics involving the use
of severe hard places—such as physical brutality, extremely prolonged
incommunicado interrogation, or deprivation of physical necessities such
as food and water—coercive as applied to any suspect.86 But courts have
begun to permit other less severe RHP dilemmas when applied to a suspect
of typical mental fortitude,87 while sometimes prohibiting the same
dilemmas when applied to an especially susceptible suspect, such as an
intellectually disabled person or minor.88 The flaw with this approach is
that it is impossible to determine just how costly or undesirable a given
hard place seems to an individual suspect by simply looking at his age and

an analytic quagmire by attempting to measure the level of force used against a suspect and
the effect of such force on the suspect’s state of mind. This move allowed the Court to
greatly expand the levels of force permissible before a confession would be considered
involuntary.
Id.; see also Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and
Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 297 (2006) (“Legal scholars criticize the [Due Process]
‘voluntariness’ test as subjective, amorphous, and incapable of consistent judicial administration.”).
85. See supra note 80.
86. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (physical brutality); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (continuous thirty-six-hour interrogation); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413,
414−15 (1967) (per curiam) (deprivation of physical necessities).
87. See Feld, supra note 84, at 297 n.217 (“[I]n the absence of extreme cases of threats, force, or
prolonged interrogation, voluntariness focuses on interrogators practices and individual’s
characteristics with no determinative factors.”); see also discussion in supra note 84.
88. Compare Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (rejecting confession obtained
after eight to nine hours of sustained interrogation where the suspect was likely “insane and
incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed”), with Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 167–68, 185
(1953), overruled in part on other grounds by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (upholding
confessions obtained after twelve hours of intermittent questioning “stretched out over a 32-hour
period” where the suspects were “not young, soft, ignorant or timid”; one suspect was arrested at 9
AM, interrogated for four to five hours starting at 9 PM, and then interrogated for eight more hours
starting at 10 AM the next day; the other suspect was arrested at 2 AM, questioned for an hour the
next morning, for another two hours after lunch, and then for seven hours from 7 PM to 2 AM).
Compare In re Elias V., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (finding a 13-year-old’s confession
involuntary where the Reid Technique was used), with JOHN E. REID & ASSOCS., WHAT DO THE
COURTS
SAY
ABOUT
THE
REID
TECHNIQUE?,
http://www.reid.com/pdfs/wtcs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z2XN-HBSK] (listing excerpts from court cases permitting the use of the Reid
Technique). But see Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 442 (1961) (distinguishing from Stein based on the
suspect’s “youth, his subnormal intelligence, and his lack of previous experience with the police,”
inter alia); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599–600 (1948) (“A 15-year-old lad, questioned through the
dead of night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men possibly might stand
the ordeal from midnight to 5 a.m. But we cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the
police in such a contest.”).
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mental competency89—so permitting the use of any RHP dilemmas during
interrogation runs the risk of producing inaccurate confessions.
Perhaps because the Due Process voluntariness doctrine is not
concerned with ensuring reliability, the Supreme Court has accepted this
risk. Modern courts routinely allow interrogation tactics (once prohibited
under the common law voluntariness doctrine) such as making suspects
believe they face the hard place of probable conviction and implying that
they will receive leniency only if they “cooperate” by confessing.90 In fact,
one of the most commonly used modern interrogation techniques, the Reid
Technique, relies on this type of manipulation of an RHP dilemma, toying
with a suspect’s hope and fear in the exact ways that the common law
voluntariness doctrine warned would lead to false confessions.91
The Reid Technique generally involves both (1) assurances that the
law enforcement officers know the suspect is guilty and that the state
already has a strong case against him and (2) implied promises or
suggestions that confessing will improve the suspect’s situation.92 To
89. Cf. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897) (“[T]he law cannot measure the force
of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and therefore excludes
the declaration if any degree of influence has been exerted.” (quoting 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL,
A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478 (Horace Smith & A.P.P. Keep eds., 6th ed. 1896))).
90. E.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737–38 (1969) (upholding the validity of a confession
where the police first created a hard place by telling the defendant “falsely, that [his confederate] had
been brought in and that he had confessed” and then implied that the government might be
understanding if the defendant confessed by “sympathetically suggest[ing] that the victim had started
a fight by making homosexual advances”); Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986) (permitting
the police to manipulate a suspect by telling lies and making an implied promise that the suspect would
not be prosecuted, but would instead receive psychiatric treatment, if he confessed); see Miriam S.
Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive
Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 115 (2006) (“Interrogations . . . where
interrogators have misled suspects to believe that police possessed inculpatory evidence, including
physical evidence or accomplices’ confessions have generally been held to be voluntary.”); Saul M.
Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCH.
215, 224 (2005) (describing how innocent people “succumb to pressures to confess when isolated,
trapped by false evidence, and offered hope via minimization and the leniency it implies” in a report
on the effects of widely used interrogation techniques on innocent suspects); Feld, supra note 84, at
221 (“Misrepresenting facts, presenting false evidence, lying, and deceit are part and parcel of the
interrogation process.”).
91. See Kozinski, supra note 53, at 307 n.32 (“Bram swept so broadly that, were it good law
today, it would almost certainly vitiate many of the tactics used by police in applying the Reid
Method.”); see also Gohara, supra note 90, at 127 (“Pursuant to Reid’s technique, convincing a suspect
that incriminating himself will inure to his benefit requires both persuading the suspect that the benefits
of confession are relatively high (e.g. internal peace, more lenient punishment, end of interrogation)
and that the costs of confession are relatively low (e.g. futility of continued denial, possibility that the
crime was morally justified).”).
92. Kozinski, supra note 53, at 311–12 (describing three major components of the Reid
Technique: “(1) tell the suspect you already know for sure he committed the crime, and cut off any
attempts on his part to deny it; (2) offer the suspect more than one scenario for how he committed the
crime, and suggest that his conduct was likely the least culpable, perhaps even morally justifiable
(minimization); (3) overstate the strength of the evidence the police have inculpating the suspect—by

2021]

Rock & Hard Place Arguments

673

implement the first tactic, the interrogator may use false evidence ploys,93
which can lead even innocent suspect to believe that his fate is sealed
against him and that he will face years in prison if he does not cooperate.94
To implement the second tactic, the interrogator may suggest that he will
be sympathetic to the suspect if he tells a certain story of how and why he
committed the crime or “that the interrogator will intercede with the
prosecutor or the judge on the suspect’s behalf so that he’ll get away with
a light sentence or perhaps no sentence at all.”95 Overall, the Reid
Technique is aimed (often successfully96) at altering the suspect’s costbenefit analysis so that he believes the rock of confessing is better than the
hard place of inevitably being convicted without confessing.97
Despite the Supreme Court’s apparent acceptance of interrogators
manipulating RHP dilemmas through the Reid Technique, in one Due
Process voluntariness decision, Garrity v. New Jersey, the Court reasoned
that RHP situations are inherently coercive.98 It did so to reach a
conclusion protecting police officers99: a class of accused individuals that
the Court perhaps favors. In Garrity, before questioning police officers
about whether they were involved in fixing traffic tickets,100 the
interrogator warned each officer “(1) that anything he said might be used
against him in any state criminal proceeding; (2) that he had the privilege
to refuse to answer if the disclosure would tend to incriminate him; but (3)
that if he refused to answer he would be subject to removal from office.”101
The officers answered the questions, effectively confessing
their involvement with the traffic fixing scheme.102 The Supreme Court
found that the threat of removal from office forced the defendants to make
inventing non-existent physical evidence or witness statements, for example—and assuring him he’ll
get convicted regardless of whether he talks”).
93. Id.
94. Gohara, supra note 90, at 127.
95. Kozinski, supra note 53, at 312.
96. See id. (“The Reid organization claims that upwards of 80 percent of those interrogated
according to the Reid Method confess.”).
97. Cf. Gohara, supra note 90, at 126 (“To this end, the Reid Technique requires interrogators to
convince suspects that the benefits of confession will be relatively high (e.g. lenient sentencing, end
of stressful interrogation, release from custody) and that the costs of his confession will be relatively
low (e.g. he will be convicted anyway because there is enough other evidence to prove the case against
him).”).
98. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 498 (1967) (“Where the choice is ‘between the rock
and the whirlpool,’ duress is inherent . . . .”).
99. See id. at 500.
100. Id. at 494. Traffic ticket-fixing occurs when police officers destroy the traffic tickets of
friends or family members as a favor. Bennett L. Gershman, Ticket-Fixing: It Isn’t “Professional
Courtesy,” It’s Racketeering, HUFFPOST (Dec. 31, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
ticketfixing-it-isnt-prof_b_1068374 [https://perma.cc/G46B-BD6J].
101. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494.
102. Id. at 495.
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“‘a choice between the rock and the whirlpool’ which made the statements
products of coercion in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”103
According to the Court, the officers faced the impossible decision either
to incriminate themselves or lose their jobs.104 This set of options,
the Court found, “is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain
silent.”105 The Court concluded that presenting an individual with an
RHP dilemma is “likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to
disable him from making a free and rational choice,” making his
confessions involuntary and inadmissible as evidence under the
Fourteenth Amendment.106
Garrity is interesting for two reasons. First, Garrity treats
RHP dilemmas that coerce confessions as closely analogous—if not
identical—to RHP dilemmas that force suspects to forfeit their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.107 In reaching the
conclusion that the police officers’ confessions were involuntary, the
Court relied on previous decisions that held it is impermissible to penalize
the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege with the “deprivation of a
livelihood.”108 Garrity also repeatedly uses Fifth Amendment language
103. Id. at 496.
104. Id. at 497.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 497–98 (quoting language from a prior Supreme Court decision: “Where the choice
is ‘between the rock and the whirlpool,’ duress is inherent in deciding to ‘waive’ one or the other”
(citation omitted)).
107. Perhaps because of this, the Supreme Court later spoke of Garrity as if it were a decision
not about coerced confessions but about compelled testimony that would violate the Fifth Amendment
unless the police officers were granted “use and derivative use” immunity. Steven D. Clymer,
Compelled Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1317–20,
1342 (2001) (describing how the Garrity Court “determined that the due process protection for coerced
confessions . . . required suppression,” but the Supreme Court’s later decision Lefkowitz v. Turley
“offered a different rationale for the result in Garrity: The police officers’ compelled statements were
analogous to immunized testimony and thus inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment privilege”
(quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972))); see Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,
82 (1973) (“It seems to us that the State intended to accomplish what Garrity specifically prohibited—
to compel testimony that had not been immunized.”). See supra note 11 for a discussion of Fifth
Amendment immunity. Some scholars have also described Garrity as a Fifth Amendment decision, in
spite of Garrity’s explicit reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process voluntariness doctrine.
See Godsey, supra note 50, at 494 (“The [Garrity] Court held that the imposition of this penalty
rendered [the officers’] statements compelled in violation of the self-incrimination clause . . . .”). This
confusion reflects both Garrity’s repeated references to Fifth Amendment cases and principles and the
general murkiness surrounding the line between when the Due Process voluntariness doctrine governs
and when the Fifth Amendment governs.
108. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967) (holding that the Fifth Amendment “should not
be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price
for asserting it”); see Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497 (citing Spevack, 385 U.S. at 514). The Court later
discussed whether the police officers had somehow waived the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process voluntariness requirement by accepting state employment. Garrity, 385 U.S.
at 498–99. It resolved the issue by looking to a case about using the “threat of discharge” to elicit
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when describing the coercive RHP dilemma faced by the police officers,
framing it as a choice between “self-incrimination” and job loss.109 This
suggests that while courts generally apply the Due Process voluntariness
doctrine (rather than Fifth Amendment doctrine) in confession cases,110
some judges and justices may still view the suspect’s decision to confess
as the forfeiture of his privilege against self-incrimination (unless he is
granted immunity).111 In this way, the modern Due Process voluntariness
doctrine effectively operates not only to promote fundamental fairness and
discourage tactics that result in unreliable confessions, but also to limit
attempts of law enforcement officers to force suspects to waive the Fifth
Amendment privilege during interrogation.112
Second, Garrity is significant because if the Supreme Court applied
Garrity’s reasoning—that forcing a defendant to choose between “the rock
and the whirlpool” is inherently coercive—more broadly, the Due Process
voluntariness doctrine would look more like the Bram/common law
voluntariness doctrine. However, in the years since Garrity, courts have
continued to allow interrogators to use various tactics manipulating RHP
dilemmas to obtain confessions.113 This is likely because courts recognize

forfeiture of the Fifth Amendment, finding that case more relevant than other cases about conditioning
employment on the waiver of a constitutional right. Id. at 499.
109. E.g., id. at 496 (“[The question is] whether, valid or not, the fear of being discharged . . . for
refusal to answer on the one hand and the fear of self-incrimination on the other was ‘a choice between
the rock and the whirlpool’ which made the statements products of coercion in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The choice imposed on petitioners was one between self-incrimination or
job forfeiture.”).
110. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985) (“Indeed, even after holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies in the context of custodial
interrogations [in] Miranda v. Arizona . . . the Court has continued to measure confessions against the
requirements of due process.”). This is true unless there is a Miranda issue—e.g., if the suspect was
subject to a custodial interrogation, and the interrogators failed to read the Miranda warnings. See
supra note 80.
111. Cf. Godsey, supra note 50, at 509 (“The self-incrimination clause’s ban on compelled
confessions remains applicable to interrogations, but the Court has not clearly defined its meaning. As
a result, many have undoubtedly assumed that the test under the self-incrimination clause is now
identical to the due process involuntary confession rule and that both doctrines overlap and
simultaneously prohibit the admission of involuntary confessions. Dicta and ‘loose language’ in
several Supreme Court opinions may support this assumption.”). For a more detailed discussion on
the relationship between the voluntariness doctrine and the Fifth Amendment privilege, see supra note
50.
112. See supra note 50.
113. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737–38 (1969) (decided just two years after
Garrity, upholding the validity of a confession where the police first created a hard place by telling
the defendant “falsely, that [his confederate] had been brought in and that he had confessed” and then
implied that the government might be understanding if the defendant confessed by “sympathetically
suggest[ing] that the victim had started a fight by making homosexual advances”); see also other cases
and tactics discussed in supra note 90.
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that such tactics can be a powerful tool for interrogators114 and fear a
decline in confessions if police officers are entirely banned from using
them. These courts may have forgotten that, for the same reasons RHP
dilemmas are effective at convincing the guilty to confess, they are also
effective at convincing the innocent to confess.115 Perhaps the best solution
is for the criminal justice system to move away from a reliance on
confessions as evidence because confessions elicited during interrogation
often say more about how defendants handle RHP dilemmas than about
their guilt or innocence.116
C. Dilemmas at Death Penalty Proceedings
Prior to Penry v. Lynaugh, jury instructions at Texas death penalty
proceedings placed intellectually disabled defendants117 between a rock
and a hard place. Under Texas law, during a death penalty sentencing
hearing, the jury had to answer three questions (or “special issues”).118 Of
relevance to the intellectually disabled defendant’s dilemma, Special Issue
1 asked whether the defendant acted “deliberately” in causing the victim’s
death, and Special Issue 2 asked whether the defendant would likely pose
a danger in the future.119 If the jury answered “yes” to all of the special
issues, the defendant would receive the death penalty.120
An intellectually disabled defendant had two options: (1) introduce
evidence of his disability in hopes of earning a “no” on Special Issue 1 or
(2) conceal the evidence in hopes of earning a “no” on Special Issue 2.
Each option carried its own risks. If the defendant pursued Option One, he
could use the evidence to argue that he was not capable of acting
deliberately (Special Issue 1). However, the prosecutor could then argue
that if the defendant was indeed disabled, his disability made him more
likely to pose a danger in the future (Special Issue 2) by preventing him
114. See Kozinski, supra note 53 (describing the high success rate of the Reid Technique); Ofshe
& Leo, supra note 58, at 985−86 (“Police [successfully] elicit the decision to confess from the guilty
by leading them to believe that the evidence against them is overwhelming, that their fate is certain
(whether or not they confess), and that there are advantages that follow if they confess.”).
115. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
116. Cf. THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 56 (Richard A. Leo & George C.
Thomas III eds., 1998) (“[B]y any standards of human discourse, a criminal confession can never truly
be called voluntary. With rare exception, a confession is compelled, provoked and manipulated from
a suspect by a detective who has been trained in a genuinely deceitful art.”).
117. “The mental health community has provided clear criteria for a finding of intellectual
disability: significant limitation in intellectual ability and adaptive behavior, manifesting itself prior
to the age of 18.” Intellectual Disability, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
policy-issues/intellectual-disability [https://perma.cc/A3U2-6VUF].
118. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 310 (1989), holding modified by Boyde v. California, 494
U.S. 370 (1990), and abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
119. Id. Special Issue 3 is not relevant to the dilemma discussed.
120. Id.
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from learning from his mistakes.121 The jury might decide that the
defendant was impaired enough to pose a future danger but not enough to
be incapable of acting deliberately.122 Fearing the defendant might commit
another violent crime, the jury might then answer “yes” to all the special
issues. To try to avoid this risk, the defendant could opt for Option Two
and choose not to introduce the evidence. But then the jurors would have
no reason to doubt the deliberateness of the defendant’s actions and would
likely answer “yes” to Special Issue 1, and they might still answer “yes”
to Special Issue 2. Thus, the defendant was stuck between a rock and a
hard place: Evidence of his intellectual disability was, as the Supreme
Court put it, a “two-edged sword” that “may diminish his blameworthiness
for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be
dangerous in the future.”123 The intellectually disabled defendant had little
chance of escaping the death penalty without using that sword—yet if he
used the sword, he risked being killed by his own blade.
In Penry, the Supreme Court sought to improve the intellectually
disabled defendant’s situation. It required that the trial court judge make it
clear that the jury could consider evidence of intellectual disability as
mitigating evidence.124 In response to Penry’s mandate, Texas revised its
jury instructions for death penalty sentencing proceedings, adding an issue
that asked “whether . . . there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or
circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than
a death sentence be imposed.”125 This change did not resolve the
intellectually disabled defendant’s RHP dilemma. If the defendant
introduced evidence of intellectual disability as a “mitigating
circumstance,” he would still risk the jury fearing his future dangerousness
all the more on account of his disability.126 A skilled prosecutor could
easily make an RHP argument, e.g., “Even if Defendant is intellectually
disabled, that just means he isn’t going to learn his lesson and will likely

121. See id. at 323–24 (“The prosecutor argued at the penalty hearing that there was ‘a very
strong probability, based on the history of this defendant, his previous criminal record, and the
psychiatric testimony that we’ve had in this case, that the defendant will continue to commit acts of
this nature.’”).
122. See, e.g., Pia Quimson-Guevarra & Tyler G. Jones, Post-Atkins Determination of
Intellectual Disability in a Death Penalty Case in Oregon, 44 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 394,
395 (2016) (describing case where jury determined that intellectually disabled defendant acted
deliberately).
123. Penry, 492 U.S. at 310.
124. Id. at 328.
125. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Texas and the Mentally Retarded Capital Offender, 30 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 60 (2004).
126. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“As Penry demonstrated, moreover, reliance
on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood
that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury.”).
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commit more violent crimes—the only way to ensure he hurts no one else
is to put him to death.” Because the revised instructions gave the jury full
discretion to decide whether any mitigating circumstances warranted a
reduced sentence, a fearful jury could follow the prosecutor’s lead and
condemn an intellectually disabled defendant to the death penalty, even if
the defendant proved his disability.
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court at last eliminated the RHP
situation by taking the decision of whether to execute an intellectually
disabled defendant out of the jury’s hands. The Court held that, under the
Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis,127 the death penalty is a
constitutionally excessive punishment for any intellectually disabled128
defendant—meaning that if a defendant proves his disability, the jury can
no longer choose to condemn him to death.129 To comply with Atkins,
trial courts now have special evidentiary hearings focused exclusively on
whether a defendant is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible
for the death penalty.130 At these hearings, defendants can present evidence
of intellectual disability without worrying about that choice
backfiring. Modern law therefore protects intellectually disabled
defendants from the unique RHP situations that once posed a danger to
their ability to achieve justice.
II. ROCK AND HARD PLACE DILEMMAS THAT KEEP PLAINTIFFS OUT OF
COURT
Courts have also recognized RHP dilemmas that civil plaintiffs face
and even, in limited circumstances, offered remedies. Many of these RHP
dilemmas are hurdles that prevent plaintiffs from ever getting into court.
In this section, we review four such dilemmas. In Subsection A, we
describe a case in which the Supreme Court eliminated an RHP dilemma
that plaintiffs faced while seeking to bring cases under the Takings
Clause131 in federal court. Then, in the remaining subsections, we address
two RHP dilemmas that the Court has enforced rather than eliminated. In
Subsection B, we review how RHP dilemmas often operate to the
127. Id.
128. The term “mentally retarded” was used at the time of Atkins. Id. at 306; see Anthony P.
Wartnik, Intellectual Disability: The Death Penalty and Atkins v. Virginia: Not the Solution, but the
Beginning of the Solution . . . and the Beat Goes On! (Part II), 5 FORENSIC SCHOLARS TODAY, no. 1,
2019, at 1, 1 (discussing how in Atkins, “the U.S. Supreme Court barred the execution of individuals
who have an intellectual disability (formerly referred to as mentally retarded)”).
129. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304.
130. See, e.g., Supreme Court Orders Atkins Hearing for Louisiana Death Row Prisoner,
A.B.A. (June 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_
representation/project_press/2015/summer/supreme-court-orders-atkins-hearing-for-louisianaprisoner/ [https://perma.cc/39BV-RGPK] (discussing how Atkins hearings work).
131. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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detriment of plaintiffs seeking standing. Most frequently, plaintiffs find
themselves stuck between losing a case for failing to assert standing on the
one hand and losing for failure to state a claim on the other. In addition,
plaintiffs—climate activists in particular—have found themselves unable
to simultaneously satisfy the different prongs of Article III standing. In
Subsection C, we explain an RHP dilemma that some plaintiffs have faced
when trying to sue states.
A. Knick v. Township of Scott: An Example of a Rock and Hard Place
Dilemma that the Court Addressed
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents private
property from being “taken for public use, without just compensation.”132
However, prior to Knick v. Township of Scott,133 an RHP dilemma
“precluded [plaintiffs] from ever bringing a Fifth Amendment takings
claim”134 in federal court, making the Takings Clause difficult to enforce.
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank
required a plaintiff to exhaust all possible remedies in the relevant state
regulatory agency and state court before suing for “just compensation” in
federal court.135 At the same time, under San Remo Hotel v. City and
County of San Francisco, a final state court decision in a takings case
precluded the plaintiff from relitigating the same issue in federal court.136
In a law review article expertly describing the dilemma, Professor Ilya
Somin commented that it was “virtually impossible to bring a takings case
in federal court without first going to state court. But going to state court
itself made it impossible to file a case in federal court afterwards.”137
In Knick, the Supreme Court overturned Williamson County,
eradicating this RHP dilemma by allowing takings plaintiffs to go directly
to federal court.138 Writing for the Court in Knick, Chief Justice Roberts
acknowledged this explicitly, observing that under Williamson, “[t]he
takings plaintiff . . . f[ound] himself in a Catch-22: He [could not] go to
federal court without going to state court first; but if he [went] to state
court and los[t], his claim [would] be barred in federal court. The federal

132. Id.
133. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
134. Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2003),
abrogated by San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
135. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172,
186–97 (1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2162.
136. San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 326–27.
137. Ilya Somin, Knick v. Township of Scott: Ending a Catch-22 that Barred Takings Cases
from Federal Court, 18 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 156 (2019).
138. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.
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claim [would] die[] aborning.”139 Although the Knick Court did away with
this dilemma, the courts enforce, rather than rectify, most other RHP
dilemmas that plaintiffs face.
B. Rock and Hard Place Arguments that Plaintiffs Face While Seeking
Standing
Plaintiffs often find themselves confronted with RHP situations
when seeking standing in civil suits. To be successful in a lawsuit, a
plaintiff must both show that she has standing and present a winning
argument on the merits. Standing doctrine finds its roots in Article III of
the Constitution, which restricts federal courts to hearing “actual cases or
controversies,” as opposed to abstract harms and advisory opinions.140
It is the reason that Hillary Brooke cannot sue Bud Abbott for hitting Lou
Costello; Costello has to raise his own complaint.141 To prove standing,
a plaintiff must allege that (1) she has suffered a concrete, particularized
injury or that such an injury is imminent, (2) her injury is traceable
to the defendant’s misconduct (traceability), and (3) her injury is
redressable, meaning that a favorable outcome in the case would remedy
her injury (redressability).142
Many scholars have critiqued standing as arbitrary and ineffective on
the theory that plaintiffs can recharacterize a claim to overcome standing
hurdles.143 However, recharacterizing the claim has an important
139. Id. Catch-22 situations are a subset of RHP dilemmas. In a typical RHP dilemma, an actor
is caught between two choices, which we can refer to as A and B, each of which leads to a negative
outcome. In a Catch-22 situation, both A and B lead to the same negative outcome C, which is generally
maintaining the status quo. There is no way for the person facing the dilemma to escape C. This may
be because A and B are mutually dependent, so the person cannot succeed at doing either (i.e., he
cannot succeed at A without first doing B, and he cannot succeed at B without first doing A); or it may
be because both A and B simply lead back to C. See Catch-22, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catch-22 [https://perma.cc/59TD-NNUG] (defining
Catch-22 as “a problematic situation for which the only solution is denied by a circumstance
inherent in the problem or by a rule” and providing the example of “the show-business catch22—no work unless you have an agent, no agent unless you’ve worked”). In this Article’s
introductory example, Orr faces a Catch-22 situation because no matter whether he (A) voluntarily
continues to fly or (B) asks to be grounded, he is unable to escape the negative outcome C—
maintaining the status quo of flying. Both A and B lead back to C. See text accompanying supra
note 1.
140. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
141. Abbott and Costello: Who’s on First? (ABC television broadcast Oct. 6, 1938). For younger
readers, Abbott and Costello was a slapstick comedy, and Abbott often smacked Costello around.
Hillary Brooke was their neighbor. We recommend watching an episode when you finish reading this
Article!
142. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
143. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Article II Revisionism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 131, 132 n.9 (1993)
(“In Lujan [(a key case where the plaintiff was denied standing)], the injury could have been
recharacterized in opportunity-like terms, and, in that event, there would have been no problem with
injury in fact, causation, or redressability.”); Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural Injury
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downside: It often erects a hurdle to bringing a successful claim on the
merits. Although plaintiffs can usually find something that can be
characterized as a concrete, particularized injury, many harms that may be
de facto injurious will not give rise to a substantive legal claim.144
Consider, as one example, a tort plaintiff who brings a federal
diversity action claiming that a defendant (e.g., a landlord, school district,
or employer) failed to adequately mitigate risk from lead paint or asbestos
exposure.145 If the plaintiff has already developed an illness due to the
exposure, then the plaintiff has an easy case for damages.146 On the other
hand, a plaintiff who does not yet exhibit symptoms cannot demonstrate
the same injury in fact. Therefore, to surmount the standing hurdle, the
plaintiff must recharacterize the harm that she has suffered.
The clearest way for the plaintiff in our example to establish injury
in fact is to assert that the harm she suffered is the exposure itself. In
certain states, plaintiffs can sue for damages such as medical monitoring
costs, whereas in other states, tort law does not create a cause of action for
mere exposure.147 In states like Michigan and Kentucky that do not
recognize medical monitoring costs,148 recharacterizing the injury to
surmount the Article III threshold removes the plaintiff’s claim for liability
under state law. Therefore, depending on the choice of law provision that
the federal court applies, a plaintiff will face an RHP dilemma: She can
Standing After Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 296 (1995) (noting that cases
in the affirmative action context “suggest that the Court will recognize the claims of procedural injury
plaintiffs if they satisfy the redressability criteria by recharacterizing their injuries as injuries to
opportunity”); Heather Elliott, The Misfit Between Standing Doctrine and Its Purposes, ADMIN. &
REGUL. L. NEWS, Spring 2009, at 13 (“Numerous critics have assailed standing jurisprudence, and
dissenting members of the Court have described the extremes of standing analysis as a ‘word game
played by secret rules . . . .’”); cf. Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91
B.U. L. REV. 159, 171 (2011) (“A standard critique of standing doctrine holds that the doctrine is so
malleable that courts have unseemly opportunities to implement their policy preferences under the
guise of a jurisdictional dismissal.”).
144. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (discussing that plaintiffs’ stigmatic
harm did not constitute a legal injury), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
145. Michael C. Dorf, Professor, Cornell L. Sch., Federal Courts Lecture (Sept. 2019).
146. For example, the plaintiff may use hospital records and medical bills as evidence to present
their claim.
147. Compare, e.g., Friends for All Child., Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816,
837–38 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (interpreting District of Columbia law to allow medical monitoring injuries),
and Doe v. City of Stamford, 699 A.2d 52, 55, 55 n.8 (Conn. 1997) (allowing medical monitoring for
workers compensation), and Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 106–07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (recognizing medical monitoring as an injury for negligence claims), and Burns v. Jaquays
Mining Co., 752 P.2d 28, 33–34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing medical monitoring claims where
plaintiff has asserted an environmental tort), with, e.g., Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684,
686 (Mich. 2005) (rejecting monitoring claims without present injury), and Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst
Lab’ys, 82 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Ky. 2002) (same).
148. See supra note 147.
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either (1) argue that her injury is physical, but provide scant evidence of
physical symptoms and therefore face dismissal for lack of standing or (2)
classify her injury as exposure, in which case a court will dismiss her case
for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Not only does the interplay between standing and Rule 12(b)(6)
create an RHP dilemma, but many plaintiffs also face an RHP dilemma
within the framework of Article III standing itself. Climate change
litigation provides an example of this. Ever since the public became aware
of the detrimental effects of global warming on both humans and the
environment,149 plaintiffs have raised a number of different theories to
challenge federal actions that accelerate climate change.150 Many of these
plaintiffs can provide evidence that they have experienced concrete,
particularized injuries resulting from climate change151 and have colorable
claims that federal actions contributing to climate change are unlawful.152
However, courts rarely reach the merits of these claims because the
“traceability” and “redressability” prongs of Article III standing leave such
climate-change plaintiffs stuck between a rock and a hard place.
If plaintiffs try to take on federal actions one-by-one, they will almost
certainly fail to demonstrate traceability because they cannot prove that
just one federal action caused (or was a “substantial factor” in causing) a
global phenomenon like the rapid acceleration of climate change and the
harms resulting from it.153 To avoid this issue, they can take the approach
149. E.g., The Effects of Climate Change, NASA: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ [https://perma.cc/NT5E-2B84] (“Effects that scientists had predicted
in the past would result from global climate change are now occurring: loss of sea ice, accelerated sea
level rise and longer, more intense heat waves.”); Anthony J. McMichael, Rosalie E. Woodruff &
Simon Hales, Climate Change and Human Health: Present and Future Risks, 367 LANCET 859, 859
(2006) (“Climate change will affect human health in many ways—mostly adversely.”).
150. See Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation, 16 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 21 (2020) (discussing how “[c]limate change litigation has grown exponentially in the last
decade”).
151. See Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2020). The Ninth Circuit in
Juliana affirmed the district court’s finding that plaintiffs demonstrated “concrete and particularized
injuries” from climate change; one plaintiff was forced to leave her home on the Navajo Reservation
because of water scarcity, while another “had to evacuate his coastal home multiple times because of
flooding.” Id.; see also Mary Kathryn Nagle, Tracing the Origins of Fairly Traceable: The Black Hole
of Private Climate Change Litigation, 85 TUL. L. REV. 477, 481 (2010) (discussing how various
climate change plaintiffs were able to allege injury-in-fact because “[a]s a result of climate change,
these plaintiffs have lost money, businesses, their sources of food, their homes, their coastlines, or in
the case of the Native Village of Kivalina—their entire community”).
152. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1171 (plaintiffs advanced the theory that the “government ha[d]
violated their constitutional rights, including a claimed right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to a ‘climate system capable of sustaining human life’”).
153. Cf. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868, 880 (N.D. Cal.
2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that the plaintiffs, who sued “twenty-four oil,
energy and utility companies,” failed to satisfy the traceability prong of Article III standing because
“the genesis of global warming is attributable to numerous entities which individually and
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of the plaintiffs in Juliana v. United States and reframe their lawsuit as an
attack on all the federal policies that have the cumulative effect of
increasing fossil-fuel use and accelerating climate change.154 However,
plaintiffs then run into an issue with redressability, as the Ninth Circuit’s
Juliana opinion makes clear.155 Because the Juliana plaintiffs argued that
a full “host of federal policies”156 were responsible for their climate-related
injuries, the Ninth Circuit found that remedying the harm would involve a
massive reworking of federal policy, which the court could not order
without impermissibly interfering with the authority of the political
branches.157 Because of this, the court determined that the judiciary did not
have the power to remedy the plaintiffs’ injuries and remanded the lawsuit
to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III
standing.158 Thus, in designing a claim that would get them around the
rock of dismissal on traceability grounds,159 the Juliana plaintiffs ended
up confronting the hard place of dismissal for lack of redressability.160
C. Rock and Hard Place Arguments and Abrogation of Sovereign
Immunity
Standing is not the only jurisdictional issue that creates RHP
dilemmas for plaintiffs seeking their day in court. Plaintiffs trying to get
around the hurdle of state sovereign immunity have also sometimes found
themselves stuck between a rock and a hard place. Under the Eleventh
Amendment, states inherently have sovereign immunity, which prevents

cumulatively over the span of centuries created the effects they now are experiencing”); U.N.
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A GLOBAL REVIEW 29
(2017) (describing how traceability poses an issue in U.S. climate change litigation); Kathryn Nagle,
supra note 151, at 514 (discussing how the modern traceability doctrine “threatens to leave climate
change victims with absolutely no recourse in the courts,” even in the aftermath of the promising
Supreme Court decision Massachusetts v. EPA). But cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523
(2007) (finding that “EPA’s refusal to regulate [greenhouse gas] emissions [from new motor vehicles]
‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’ injuries” from climate change).
154. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1165 (“The operative complaint accuses the government of continuing
to ‘permit, authorize, and subsidize’ fossil fuel use despite long being aware of its risks, thereby
causing various climate-change related injuries to the plaintiffs.”).
155. Id. at 1171.
156. Id. at 1169.
157. Id. at 1169–71 (finding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate redressability because, inter
alia, “it is beyond the power of an Article III court to order, design, supervise, or implement the
plaintiffs’ requested remedial plan . . . [which] would necessarily require a host of complex policy
decisions entrusted, for better or worse, to the wisdom and discretion of the executive and legislative
branches”).
158. Id. at 1171, 1175.
159. See id. at 1169 (“The district court also correctly found the Article III causation requirement
satisfied for purposes of summary judgment.”).
160. Id. at 1171, 1175.
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plaintiffs from suing a state for monetary damages in federal court.161 A
state may, however, waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to a
particular lawsuit or agreeing to be sued in general.162 Additionally, the
states all implicitly consented to suit by the federal government by
ratifying the U.S. Constitution.163 Thus, the federal government effectively
has an exemption from state sovereign immunity and can bring lawsuits
against states.164 Further, in limited circumstances, Congress may abrogate
state sovereign immunity and thereby permit citizens to sue states165—for
example, the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to pass
legislation preventing state discrimination against protected classes and to
abrogate state sovereign immunity from suits enforcing such legislation.166
To abrogate state sovereign immunity, Congress must make a
clear legislative statement of its intent to allow certain lawsuits to proceed
against states.167
This “clear statement” rule posed a hurdle to the plaintiffs in
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, who sought
damages against the state of Alaska under a federal statute.168 Because the
statute was somewhat ambiguous about whether Congress intended to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, the plaintiffs had a losing abrogation
argument.169 The plaintiffs tried to get around this hurdle by creatively170
161. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890). Plaintiffs can, however, seek a prospective
injunction against actions by state officers that would violate the Constitution or federal law. Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (“[S]ince
our decision in Ex parte Young, we often have found federal jurisdiction over a suit against a state
official when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to ‘end a continuing violation
of federal law.’” (citations omitted)).
162. Hans, 134 U.S. at 17.
163. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892).
164. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785 (1991) (referring to the “Federal
Government’s exemption from state sovereign immunity”).
165. Congress cannot broadly abrogate state sovereign immunity from all lawsuits. Rather, it can
only abrogate state sovereign immunity from lawsuits enforcing Acts of Congress passed pursuant to
certain constitutional provisions. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (“Thus our inquiry into whether
Congress has the power to abrogate unilaterally the States’ immunity from suit is narrowly focused on
one question: Was the Act in question passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress
the power to abrogate?”).
166. E.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“We think that Congress may, in
determining what is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.”).
167. E.g., Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786 (“We have repeatedly said that this power to abrogate can
only be exercised by a clear legislative statement.”); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1989);
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57 n.9.
168. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786–87.
169. Id.
170. The Court was not impressed with the plaintiffs’ creativity. See id. at 786 (“The delegation
theory is entirely a creature of respondents’ own invention.”).
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recharacterizing the statute as a “delegation” of the federal government’s
exemption from state sovereign immunity, instead of an abrogation of state
sovereign immunity.171 They argued that through the statute, the federal
government delegated its exemption to Native American tribes, such as
the plaintiffs.172 However, the plaintiffs then faced a hard place: the federal
government likely cannot constitutionally delegate its exemption, so
(in accordance with principles of constitutional avoidance) the
Court refused to read the statute as an attempted delegation.173 The Court
found that state sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs’ claims
for damages and, cornered by an RHP dilemma, the plaintiffs did not get
their day in court.174
Since Blatchford, other plaintiffs have (unsuccessfully) attempted to
get around the rock of a weak abrogation argument by recharacterizing a
statute as a delegation of the federal government’s exemption from state
sovereign immunity. In the recent case In re PennEast Pipeline Co.,175 a
pipeline company sought to exercise eminent domain against a
nonconsenting state under the Natural Gas Act (NGA).176 The plaintiff
company chose not to bring an abrogation argument, likely recognizing
that such an argument would fail because Congress passed the NGA
pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority, and Congress lacks the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting under the Commerce
Clause.177 Instead, it characterized the NGA as a delegation of the federal
government’s eminent domain power against states—which it claimed
inherently included the government’s exemption from state sovereign
immunity—to pipeline companies.178 However, in making this argument,
171. Id. at 785 (“[O]ur cases require Congress’ exercise of the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, where it exists, to be exercised with unmistakable clarity. To avoid that difficulty,
respondents assert that § 1362 represents not an abrogation of the States’ sovereign immunity, but
rather a delegation to tribes of the Federal Government’s exemption from state sovereign immunity.”).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 785 (“We doubt, to begin with, that that sovereign exemption can be delegated . . . .”).
174. Id. at 788.
175. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 2019), as amended (Sept. 19, 2019),
cert. granted, PennEast Pipeline Co., v. New Jersey, 2021 WL 357257 (U.S. Feb. 3, 2021) (No. 191039).
176. Id. at 99 (describing how the NGA, a federal statute, “allows private gas companies to
exercise the federal government’s power to take property by eminent domain, provided certain
jurisdictional requirements are met. This appeal calls on us to decide whether that delegation of power
allows gas companies to hale unconsenting States into federal court to condemn State property
interests”).
177. Id. at 108; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996). The Third Circuit
noticed and commented on the plaintiff’s strategic choice to take the “easier road” of avoiding making
a weak abrogation argument. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d at 104.
178. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d at 105 (“To maintain these suits, then, PennEast had
to offer a different answer [than abrogation] for why its suits do not offend New Jersey’s sovereign
immunity. But, as just noted, the only reason it gives – an argument of implied delegation of the federal
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the plaintiff confronted a hard place: the Supreme Court had already
expressed skepticism about the constitutionality of delegation in
Blatchford. Therefore, the Third Circuit hesitated to pioneer a holding that
the federal government can delegate its exemption to private parties.179
The court also recognized that if it sanctioned the delegation theory,
it would effectively give Congress a way to work around abrogation
requirements and open the door to a slew of new litigation against states.180
Thus, like the Supreme Court in Blatchford, the Third Circuit refused
to read the statute as a delegation and found that state sovereign
immunity applied.181
III. CRAFTING ROCK AND HARD PLACE ARGUMENTS
This Part shifts from examining rock and hard place dilemmas to
exploring rock and hard place arguments. More specifically, we discuss
how mission-driven plaintiffs do not always have to be the victims of RHP
dilemmas. Instead, they can turn the tables by constructing a pair
of arguments that creates an RHP dilemma for the judge, pressuring (or
even forcing) him to rule in their favor. Throughout Parts III through V of
this Article, it is important to delineate which argument is the “rock” and
which is the “hard place.” The “rock” argument refers to the plaintiff’s
winning argument. The “hard place” is the alternative to the winning
argument—often in the form of a losing argument—that persuades the
judge or justice to accept the plaintiff’s winning argument.
A. Rock and Hard Place Arguments as Syllogisms
By definition, rock and hard place arguments are mutually
reinforcing. In their strongest and most basic terms, RHP arguments are a
simple form of the disjunctive syllogism:
Either A or B.
If A, then C.
If B, then C.

As the syllogism demonstrates, when perfectly implemented,
RHP arguments create a world in which a judge must select between
government’s Eleventh Amendment exemption under the NGA – ignores rather than confronts the
distinction between the federal government’s eminent domain power and its exemption from Eleventh
Amendment immunity.”).
179. See id. at 106 (“But the Supreme Court’s statements in Blatchford had . . . everything to do
with the Court’s deep doubt about the ‘delegation’ theory itself.”).
180. See id. at 108 (“Yet accepting PennEast’s delegation theory would dramatically undermine
the careful limits the Supreme Court has placed on abrogation.”).
181. Id. at 113.
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two possible scenarios, A and B. From there, all roads lead to C—the
plaintiff winning.
To demonstrate the efficacy of this kind of argument, it is helpful to
compare it to the classic approach of arguing in the alternative. A diagram
of arguments in the alternative is:
If not A, then B.
If not B, then C.
If not C, then D.

Arguing in the alternative improves the plaintiff’s odds of winning.
It allows a plaintiff to bring a case under diverse legal theories, and,
assuming all the arguments have some merit, two shots are better than one
and three shots are better than two. Consider the following torts example
in which a plaintiff sues a defendant for negligently hitting the plaintiff
with his car. A defendant is negligent if he breaches a duty to the plaintiff
by acting in a way that a reasonable person would not, and thereby harms
the plaintiff.182 For purposes of this hypothetical, the plaintiff’s primary
argument might be that the defendant was negligent because the defendant
had severe narcolepsy and decided to drive anyway. A reasonable person
would know that driving with severe narcolepsy would put foreseeable
plaintiffs in harm’s way. This seems like a strong argument, but if there is
evidence of other possible claims, the plaintiff need not stop here. Maybe
the police found an open bottle of pills in the defendant’s car, and the bottle
warns, “Never operate heavy machinery after taking this medication.” And
maybe witnesses can testify that the defendant was driving home after
having drinks at a bar. Arguing in the alternative, the plaintiff could claim:
(A) the defendant was negligent for driving with severe narcolepsy;
(B) the plaintiff was negligent for driving while on medications; or (C) the
defendant was negligent for driving after having several drinks. These
arguments proceed in the alternative because the plaintiff argues that
“even if” the plaintiff does not win on Claim A, she can still win on Claim
B, and even if she does not win on Claim B, she can win on Claim C. The
plaintiff’s odds of winning the case increase with each argument, and there
is little downside: the plaintiff need only win on one argument to recover
damages, and there is no consequence if the other arguments fail.183 If the
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1965).
183. This assumes the factfinder is a logical decision-maker prepared to work through complex
arguments. In jury trials, jurors may sometimes be confused or distracted by alternative arguments;
they may be more persuaded by one strong theory of the case because they want to feel like the attorney
is telling them the one true story of what happened. Edward Marshall Hall, Trial Mistakes—The “Even
If” Catastrophe, TRIAL PRAC. TIPS (Feb. 20, 2017), http://www.trialpracticetips.com/trial-mistakesthe-even-if-catastrophe/ [https://perma.cc/H9ZQ-PERG]; see also J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, Closing
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defendant was driving drunk, that will be sufficient for the plaintiff to
recover irrespective of the other claims.
The above hypothetical illustrates the basic concept and efficacy of
arguing in the alternative. But arguing in the alternative is only impactful
if the outcome is not (or just about) predetermined. Consider animal rights
activists seeking to have animals released from a zoo that keeps the
animals in small, cement cages in the sun without adequate access to food,
water, or mental stimulation. Depending on the specific facts, plaintiffs
might bring claims under habeas corpus,184 the Endangered Species Act,185
state nuisance laws, or a combination of these three claims.186 All of these
may be winning claims, but if a judge or jury is predisposed to think that
zoos are perfectly acceptable and therefore legal, none of these arguments
will have a better chance than any other. It is not difficult to contemplate
more examples in other politically charged arenas. Plaintiffs seeking to
expand abortion rights will not likely fare any better with three theories
than with one if arguing in front of a pro-life judge, and gun rights activists
will not likely fare better with three theories than with one in front of a
judge with strong beliefs in gun control—unless one believes that all
judges assess claims from a completely neutral vantage point at all times.
For those who do not, a different strategy is desirable.
This brings us full circle back to rock and hard place arguments.
Returning to the narcolepsy hypothetical, we now envision a plaintiff who
makes the following arguments: (A) the defendant was negligent for
driving with severe narcolepsy; or (B) the defendant was negligent for
driving while under the influence of his narcolepsy medication, which has
the warning, “Never operate heavy machinery after taking this
medication.” Using this set of arguments, the plaintiff’s claims work
together rather than independently, and she therefore sets up a win–win
situation. Either (A) the defendant did not take medication, or (B) the
defendant did take medication. In Scenario A, the defendant was negligent
because he did not take the requisite measures to control his narcolepsy
before driving. In Scenario B, the defendant was negligent because he took
motor-impairing medication before driving. Regardless of whether the
judge or jury believes A or B, C is true: the defendant was negligent for
driving, and the plaintiff wins.

Argument, in THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS, AND ETHICS 373, 373 (3d ed. 2002) (admonishing
that in a jury trial, “you must commit yourself to a single theory”). This is less of a concern in bench
trials and when attorneys are arguing legal issues during appellate litigation.
184. Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 54 N.Y.S.3d 392, 392 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2017).
185. Kuehl v. Sellner, 887 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2018).
186. Id.
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An important premise of this Article is that even if the alternative
argument (Argument B above) is almost certainly a losing argument, it
still has value. Its value comes from closing off the universe of possible
defenses. Returning one final time to the above hypothetical, suppose that
after the car accident, the police obtained a warrant to test the defendant’s
blood, and the toxicology report showed that there were no traces of the
defendant’s narcolepsy medication in his system. Here, the plaintiff has a
strong argument that the defendant drove with severe narcolepsy without
taking any precautions. That is likely the only argument that will be
necessary to win the case: it is the “rock” argument. Moreover, arguing
that the defendant was negligent because he took his medication before
driving will almost certainly lose because, after the accident, there was no
trace of the medication in his system. Nevertheless, the plaintiff benefits
from bringing both claims. The claim that the defendant was negligent for
driving on motor-impairing medication operates as the “hard place” claim.
Without raising it, the plaintiff leaves the defendant with an escape route:
The defendant can insist that he was taking narcolepsy medication
regardless of what the toxicology report shows and hope he can convince
the jury. Taking the medication is a valid defense to the plaintiff’s claim
that the defendant should have anticipated having a narcoleptic fit while
driving, and the jury has no reason to find that there is anything wrong
with driving on the defendant’s narcolepsy medication if the plaintiff does
not raise the hard place claim.
In this hypothetical, of course, there is no reason to suspect that a
jury would find for a defendant who raises an implausible defense.
Imagine, however, that despite all odds (and ignoring the realities of
voir dire) every juror has narcolepsy, and they all empathize with the
defendant. Such a jury might look for a way to find in favor of the
defendant. Without the hard place claim, it may be unlikely—but it is not
impossible—for such a jury to find for the defendant. By including
the hard place claim, the plaintiff secures a win irrespective of the
jury’s inclinations.
By virtue of being oversimplified, the above hypothetical aims to
illustrate the mechanisms of RHP arguments in the legal context. Legal
arguments, however, are complex and rarely perfect syllogisms, so it is
important to recognize several more common and more realistic iterations
of the disjunctive syllogism. The first, and most common, is a slightly
more complex elaboration called the constructive dilemma:
Either A or B.
If A, then C.
If B, then D.
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Therefore, either C or D.

The constructive dilemma will be equally effective as the typical
disjunctive syllogism so long as both C and D make a judge more likely
to rule in the plaintiff’s favor. In the above example, whether the defendant
took or did not take medication, the defendant was negligent. But it is more
likely that two different sets of circumstances would make a defendant
liable under different causes of action. Sticking with the theme of
defendants running plaintiffs over in their cars, imagine a plaintiff who
argues either (A) you had your eyes on the road, you saw me lying hurt in
the road, and you decided to run me over anyway; or (B) you were not
looking at the road. If A (you were looking), then C (you hit me on
purpose), and you committed the intentional tort of battery.187 If B (you
were not looking), then D (you were negligent). Under either theory, the
defendant is liable.
The constructive dilemma can also operate in a slightly different
manner: where C is a desirable outcome for the plaintiff, but D is an
undesirable outcome to the judge for reasons unrelated to the case at
hand.188 The typical example is the slippery-slope or parade-of-horribles
argument, which the late Justice Scalia deployed regularly, most famously
in his dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas.189 In that case, which struck
down a Texas statute prohibiting same-sex sexual conduct, Justice Scalia
argued that the decision would be the end of all laws based on “moral
choices,” including “laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity.”190 Other undesirable outcomes for a judge or justice might
include abandoning tenets of judicial interpretation, such as stare decisis
or an interpretive method like textualism. We explore such RHP
arguments in Part V, examining two unexpected Supreme Court decisions
from the 2019 Term.

187. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101
(AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).
188. These types of dilemmas operate similarly to the RHP dilemmas that prosecutors use to
coerce confessions. See supra Section I.B. Just as law enforcement officers (quite effectively)
convince suspects to confess by making them believe they will otherwise face an undesirable outcome;
plaintiffs can convince judges to rule in their favor by making the judges believe that ruling against
the plaintiff will have undesirable consequences.
189. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Id. (“State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers [v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)]’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these
laws is called into question by today’s decision[.]”). We wish that, rather than pushing back on the
inevitability of this parade-of-horribles, at least one liberal justice had suggested that much of the
parade (such as same-sex marriage) would not be so horrible.
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Finally, we note that the above syllogisms often operate, in practice,
with lawyerly caveats. In law, ensuring definite outcomes is nearly always
impossible: it is almost always more accurate to characterize “if A, then
B” as “if A, then most likely B.” Even weaker forms of the syllogism are:
“if not A, then B is more likely”; “if not B, then A is more likely.” Although
arguments will rarely fit into perfect syllogisms, these weaker forms can
still prove effective.
B. Rock and Hard Place Arguments and Jurisdictional Hurdles
Standing is frequently a major threshold challenge for missiondriven plaintiffs, and not in the least because of the RHP dilemmas
described in Section II.B. But plaintiffs can also employ RHP arguments
to surmount this preliminary hurdle. Below are two examples from 2020
out of the Southern District of New York.
The first instance we consider is New York v. United States
Department of Labor,191 a case in which New York brought suit under the
Administrative Procedure Act challenging the Department of Labor’s
(DOL) Final Rule implementing the Families First Coronavirus Response
Act (FFCRA). The FFCRA “obligates employers to offer sick leave and
emergency family leave to employees who are unable to work because of
the pandemic.”192 New York argued that the DOL’s Final Rule unduly
restricted paid leave and, therefore, that the DOL exceeded its statutory
authority under FFCRA in promulgating the rule.193
To argue that it had standing to challenge the DOL’s regulations,
New York implemented two RHP arguments. First, it established that New
York had suffered injury-in-fact due to the challenged features of DOL’s
Rule. New York explained that if employees did not have access to paid
leave, then they would face one of two options: take unpaid leave or go to
work sick. If employees chose the former, New York’s income-tax
revenue would decrease because paid leave is taxable, whereas unpaid
leave is not. This argument, standing alone, was likely sufficient to
establish standing; as the court recognized, “some employees who need
leave will . . . take unpaid leave”194 and “all New York must show is that
it will be injured, not the magnitude of its injury.”195 But New York’s
alternative argument cemented that it would suffer injury-in-fact
regardless of whether any employees took unpaid leave. As New York’s
record evidence showed, if employees went to work sick instead of taking
191. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
192. Id. at 5.
193. Id. at 4.
194. Id. at 8.
195. Id.
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unpaid leave, this would “escalat[e] the spread of the virus and thereby
rais[e] the State’s healthcare costs.”196 Therefore, regardless of how
employees responded to lacking paid sick leave, the State would suffer
concrete costs.
To craft its second RHP argument in this case, New York raised two
distinct theories of standing. The first, as discussed above, was that New
York suffered from pecuniary injury the same way any private party
would. The second was that New York suffered injury to its
“quasi-sovereign interests,” which “encompass both ‘the health and
well-being —[]physical and economic—of its residents in general,’ as
well as the state’s interest in ‘not being discriminatorily denied its rightful
status within the federal system.’”197 In raising this second theory of
standing, the State sued in its parens patriae capacity,198 the analysis of
which would force the court into a “legal thicket.”199 As Judge Oetken
thoroughly detailed in the sixth footnote of his opinion, the law is unsettled
as to whether the “Mellon Bar”200 prevents states from establishing parens
patriae standing to bring statutory (as opposed to constitutional) suits
against the federal government.201
This second, parens patriae argument for standing created a hard
place for New York’s traditional, pecuniary injury argument. The court
would have needed to delve into the “legal thicket” of the second standing
theory—unless it ruled in favor of New York on its first theory. In this
way, the complex second theory of standing incentivized the court to rule
in New York’s favor on its primary theory.202
A second contemporary case in which a cause-driven plaintiff used
an RHP argument to establish standing is Natural Resources Defense

196. Id. at 7.
197. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607
(1982)) (second alteration in original).
198. A state sues in its parens patriae capacity when it sues to enforce quasi-sovereign interests.
See id. (“Though the universe of ‘quasi-sovereign interests’ has never been comprehensively defined,
it is understood to encompass both the ‘health and well-being . . . of its residents in general,’ as well
as the state’s interest in ‘not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal
system.’” (citations omitted)).
199. Id. at 9 n.6.
200. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923) (holding that states do not have parens
patriae standing in suits against the federal government, at least with respect to constitutional claims).
201. Judge Oetken describes the issue as “whether the state’s congressionally conferred cause of
action is capacious enough to support a parens patriae suit.” U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 477 F. Supp. 3d at 9
n.6. In doing so, he adopts the framing of footnote 4 of Lexmark International v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), which argues that whether a litigant has prudential standing
is better characterized as whether a litigant has a cause of action.
202. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 477 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (denying DOL’s motion to dismiss).
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Council v. United States Department of the Interior.203 In December 2017,
Daniel Jorjani, Principal Deputy Solicitor of the Department of the Interior
(DOI), issued a memorandum that, in conflict with a longstanding
interpretation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), would allow the
taking or killing of migratory birds, as long as the taking or killing was
“incidental.”204 In response, various environmental interest groups and
several states brought suit to vacate the memorandum, and the court,
holding that the memorandum was contrary to the plain text of the statute,
ultimately granted summary judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor.205
Before reaching summary judgment, DOI moved to dismiss the case,
arguing in part that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Specifically, DOI argued
that any injury to the plaintiffs would not be traceable to the government
memorandum or redressable by a favorable ruling.206 The agency further
argued that the plaintiffs’ injury “depends on [speculative] assumptions
about how potential violators of the MBTA will alter their behavior in
response to the [O]pinion, and further assumptions about how that change
in behavior will affect migratory birds.”207 Although a losing argument in
this case, DOI correctly pointed out that “[w]here redressability
‘hinge[s] on the response of the regulated . . . third party to the government
action,’ then ‘much more is needed’ and standing is ‘substantially more
difficult’ to establish.”208
Despite traceability and redressability being “substantially more
difficult” to establish in suits demanding government regulation, the
plaintiffs’ RHP argument surmounted this hurdle. Judge Caproni
eloquently acknowledged the RHP dilemma confronting the DOI, writing:
Deputy Solicitor Jorjani asserted that changing DOI’s interpretation
of the MBTA to permit incidental take was justified in part because
the Department’s longstanding contrary interpretation, and its
accompanying threat of prison time and a $15,000-per-bird fine,
‘h[ung] the sword of Damocles’ over private actors, creating a ‘threat
of prosecution’ that inhibited ‘a host of otherwise lawful and
productive actions.’ Now that the shoe is on the other foot,
203. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 397 F. Supp. 3d 430, 434
(S.D.N.Y. 2019).
204. Id.
205. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 478 F. Supp. 3d 469, 472
(S.D.N.Y. 2020).
206. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 439.
207. Id. (alterations in original).
208. Memorandum of Law of Defendants U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.
& Daniel Jorjani in Support of Their Motions to Dismiss the Complaints at 21, Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 397 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-04596-VEC)
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992)) (second and third alteration in
original).
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Defendants cannot credibly dismiss as speculative the logic
underlying the States’ theory of injury.209

Broken down into our fundamental constructive dilemma, Judge
Caproni recognized that either (A) by eliminating the threat of federal
criminal prosecution under the MBTA, the Jorjani memorandum will
significantly reduce deterrence and increase the risk that private actors will
kill migratory birds; or (B) the memorandum will not impact the behavior
of private actors. If A is true, then C, the DOI’s actions create the alleged
injury. If B is true, then D, the agency is conceding that it cannot justify
its departure from the longstanding interpretation of the statute.
IV. A CASE STUDY OF AMERICAN ANTI-VIVISECTION SOCIETY V. UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
After eighteen years (or fifty-four years by veteran Bruce Wagman’s
count),210 the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) will
finally issue regulations to protect birds under the Animal Welfare Act.211
In 2002, Congress explicitly required the USDA to issue such regulations,
but the USDA never acted.212 No matter what a human being does to
torture a bird, the federal government does not have a mechanism to hold
that person accountable. So, both the American Anti-Vivisection Society
(AAVS) and the Avian Welfare Coalition sued the agency, demanding that
it comply with Congress’s mandate.213 Initially, the district court
dismissed their case for failure to state a claim.214 But on January 10, 2020,
D.C. Circuit Judge David Tatel reversed the lower court’s order and held
that the plaintiffs “adequately alleged that USDA has failed to take a
‘discrete agency action’ that it is ‘required to take.’”215 The D.C. Circuit
remanded, ordering the lower court to decide whether this failure had
persisted for a sufficiently long period of time to constitute an

209. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 439–40 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
210. Mariann Sullivan, Animal Law Podcast #61: The Case of the Forgotten Birds, OUR HEN
HOUSE (June 24, 2020), https://www.ourhenhouse.org/2020/06/animal-law-podcast-61-the-case-ofthe-forgotten-birds/ [https://perma.cc/7EKK-PRJS]; see infra text accompanying note 222.
211. Order at 2–3, Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 351 F. Supp. 3d 16
(D.D.C. 2020) (No. 1:18-cv-01138-TNM) (order granting joint motion to stay and proposed
rulemaking schedule).
212. See 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1) (stating that the USDA “shall promulgate standards to govern the
humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals”). The term “animal” is defined as
“any . . . warm-blooded animal . . . but such term excludes (1) birds . . . bred for use in research . . . .”
7 U.S.C. § 2132(g).
213. Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 351 F. Supp. 3d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2018),
rev’d and remanded, 946 F.3d 615 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
214. Id.
215. Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 946 F.3d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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unreasonable delay.216 The circuit court’s decision tipped the scales.
Recognizing that a court would consider such a long delay unreasonable
by any standard, the USDA folded and agreed to implement regulations.217
This case seems simple on its face: an agency fails to act in line with
a direct congressional mandate for almost two decades, and eventually
courts force the agency to act. Future plaintiffs who look to this case will
likely not glean much beyond the basic takeaway about “unreasonable
delay” claims under § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act.218 Such
a takeaway, however, drastically oversimplifies the case; it is far from
clear whether an unreasonable delay claim would have won the day under
even slightly different circumstances. The brilliance of the AntiVivisection Society’s lawyering was that the plaintiffs’ losing claims
cemented the victory. The history of the litigation illuminates this point.
A. The History of the Animal Welfare Act and the PETA Case
The Animal Welfare Act (AWA) provides imperfect protection for
animals, and some scholars have even argued that its protections are
counterproductive.219 Whatever one’s views on the efficacy of the Act,
however, the AWA formally extends protections to “warm-blooded
animals” and has done so since its inception.220 Birds are warm-blooded.221
This is why, to animal-law veterans, regulations protecting birds are fiftyfour years overdue.222 Nevertheless, since 1971, the USDA has refused to
recognize that the AWA protects birds, rats, or mice.223 Recognizing
protection for these animals would drastically increase the USDA’s
workload because a vast majority of animals used in research are birds,
mice, and rats; therefore, the agency was unlikely to ever recognize birds,
mice, and rats on its own.224 Realizing this, and perhaps deciding that some
protection of birds is better than none, Congress, in 2002, amended the

216. Id. at 617.
217. Order, supra note 211.
218. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (“The reviewing court shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed.”).
219. See, e.g., Justin Marceau, How the Animal Welfare Act Harms Animals, 69 HASTINGS L.J.
925, 928 (2018) (“[A]nimal industries continually deploy the fact that they possess an AWA license
as an argument against providing transparency in their animal handling practices, as a sound bite in
the media to quell public concern, and even as a basis for defamation actions and related litigation
against animal protection groups who criticize the treatment of confined animals.”).
220. Animal Welfare Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–544, § 2(h).
221. See Sutherland Simpson, The Body Temperature of Birds, 110 NATURE 566, 567–68 (1922).
222. See Sullivan, supra note 210.
223. See Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 946 F.3d 615, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(citing 36 Fed. Reg. 24,917, 24,919 (Dec. 24, 1971)).
224. See Sue A. Leary, The Exclusion of Mice, Rats, and Birds, 125 AV MAG., no. 1, 2017, at
12, 12–13.
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AWA to require the USDA to issue standards “govern[ing] the humane
handling[] [and] care”225 of “birds” not “bred for use in research.”226
This amendment, though hardly satisfying to animal-rights activists,
at least required the USDA to act. It meant that “when feral dogs attacked
and killed several flamingos at a zoo,” or when “15 parrots died in a fire,”
the USDA should have been in a position to respond.227 Instead, over a
decade passed, and the USDA failed to issue regulations for birds or take
any action to protect them.
Such was the case in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
(PETA) v. United States Department of Agriculture, when PETA sued the
USDA demanding that the agency comply with the AWA’s mandate.228
PETA argued that, because the agency had not implemented new
regulations for birds despite a decade-old mandate, it had to enforce
existing AWA regulations against people who were mistreating birds. In
other words, USDA’s failure to enforce its general animal welfare
standards with respect to birds constituted “unlawfully withheld” agency
action under the Administrative Procedure Act.229
In one respect, the PETA case was a huge success: the court held that
PETA had standing to bring its challenge, setting important standing
precedent for non-profit organizations.230 On the merits, however, the
court rejected PETA’s argument. The court held that “nothing in the AWA
requires the USDA to apply the general animal welfare standards to
birds . . . before finalizing its bird-specific regulations.”231
In hindsight, it is easy to say that PETA ultimately brought the wrong
challenge.232 But such hindsight bias is not fair to PETA, nor is it helpful
in guiding future litigants. The USDA seemed hellbent on excluding birds
from protection, and the courts have supported the agency’s discretion. In
fact, after PETA, animal rights groups abandoned an administrative law
strategy altogether. Before bringing its case in 2018, the AAVS
225. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1).
226. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 10301, 116 Stat.
134, 491 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g)).
227. See Bruce Wagman, Birds Are Finally About to Get the Protection They Deserve, MARIN
INDEP. J. (June 15, 2020), https://www.marinij.com/2020/06/15/birds-are-finally-about-to-get-theprotection-they-deserve/ [https://perma.cc/K8Q7-KSEN].
228. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 797 F.3d
1087, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
229. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (“The reviewing court shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed.” (emphasis added)).
230. PETA, 797 F.3d at 1093–95 (noting that the plaintiffs had standing under Havens’ Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 377 (1982)).
231. Id. at 1098.
232. Importantly, PETA abandoned two of its initial claims: (1) that the USDA unreasonably
delayed enforcement in refusing to issue new regulations and (2) that the refusal to enforce existing
regulations was arbitrary and capricious. The court explicitly noted these decisions. Id. at 1091 n.1.
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approached the problem by suing the USDA for breach of contract under
the Tucker Act.233 Only after this challenge lost as well did the AAVS and
the Avian Welfare Coalition take one more stab at a challenge under the
Administrative Procedure Act.
B. Rock and Hard Place Arguments in American Anti-Vivisection
Society v. USDA
In American Anti-Vivisection Society, as discussed above, the D.C.
Circuit allowed the AAVS’s “unreasonable delay” claim to proceed.234
But, this is not because PETA had a losing claim (that the USDA had to
apply general animal welfare standards to birds), whereas Anti-Vivisection
Society had a winning claim. In Anti-Vivisection Society, unlike in PETA,
the dispositive factor was that plaintiffs used “hard place” arguments.
They did not choose among arguments that were different than PETA’s;
instead, they brought two challenges against two types of agency inaction.
AAVS first argued that the USDA’s refusal to either (1) promulgate new
regulations for birds or (2) apply the general welfare regulations to birds
was either (A) arbitrary and capricious final agency action or (B)
unreasonable delay.235 In its most basic form, this challenge breaks down
into four distinct claims: (1) the USDA’s refusal to promulgate new
regulations for birds is arbitrary and capricious; (2) the USDA’s refusal to
promulgate new regulations for birds constitutes unreasonable delay; (3)
the USDA’s refusal to apply the general welfare regulations to birds is
arbitrary and capricious; (4) the USDA’s refusal to apply the general
welfare regulations to birds constitutes an unreasonable delay. Taking
each argument in turn, as we do below, reveals that the court could rule
for the USDA under each and any of these arguments standing alone; there
was no slam dunk claim that would cause a court to force the USDA to
take action if the court was inclined not to force the USDA’s hand.
However, putting the arguments together created two different RHP
dilemmas that prevented the court from ruling for the USDA.
The first pair of arguments involves the type of action that the AWA
required the USDA to take. Because Congress, in the AWA, explicitly
mandated that the USDA provide protections for birds,236 the USDA either
had to: (1) apply its existing regulations to protect birds; or (2) write new
233. Mariann Sullivan, Animal Law Podcast #8: What’s Up with Birds and the Animal Welfare
Act? With Bruce Wagman, OUR HEN HOUSE (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.ourhenhouse.org/
2016/01/animal-law-podcast-8-whats-up-with-birds-and-the-animal-welfare-act-with-brucewagman/ [https://perma.cc/A5LH-M6CV].
234. Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 946 F.3d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
235. Id. at 618.
236. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 10301, 116
Stat. 134, 491 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g)); see also supra note 212.
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regulations to protect birds. If a plaintiff chose the first argument—that the
USDA must apply existing regulations—the court could say, “The agency
does not have to apply existing regulations. It has discretion to craft new
regulations.” Hence the holding in the PETA case. Alternatively, if a
plaintiff argued that the USDA must create new regulations, the court
could say, “The agency does not have to create new regulations. It has
discretion to apply existing regulations.” Only by bringing both claims
together does a plaintiff force the court to pick an enforcement pathway
(or tell the USDA to pick).
The second pair of arguments involves the agency’s exact
wrongdoing: namely, whether the agency has (A) taken inappropriate
action or (B) failed to take appropriate action. Here too, if a plaintiff chose
the first argument—the USDA made an arbitrary and capricious final
decision that it would not issue new regulations to protect birds or apply
existing regulations to birds—the court could say, “The agency has not
taken final action.” In the alternative, if a plaintiff chose the second
argument—the USDA has waited too long to either apply existing
regulations to birds or write new regulations for them—the court could
say, “The agency has decided (for right or wrong) not to protect birds, and
therefore, an unreasonable delay challenge is inappropriate, and
the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim.” By bringing both claims
together, however, a plaintiff forces the court to hold the USDA
accountable one way or another: either the USDA took final action in
violation of the AWA, or the USDA did not take final action and the
twenty-year delay is unreasonable.
The brilliance in recognizing—and raising—all of the arguments that
the AAVS made is that AAVS made these arguments knowing it was
impossible for all to win. First, it is impossible for an agency to have both
(1) taken no action at all (as required for an unreasonable delay claim
under § 706(1)) and (2) taken final action (as required for an arbitrary and
capricious claim under § 706(2)). Likewise, it is impossible that the
agency is required to both (A) apply general animal welfare standards to
birds and (B) issue new regulations specifically for birds. But it is also
impossible for all of these claims to lose, and that is far more important
because winning only requires one winning claim. Therefore, by raising
all four iterations, the AAVS forced the court to choose from among its
desired outcomes.
V. ROCK AND HARD PLACE ARGUMENTS THAT DICTATED UNEXPECTED
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN 2019
If the 2019 Supreme Court term taught movement lawyers anything,
it is that hard place arguments need not be plainly legal arguments. This
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Part of the Article argues that the two most unexpected decisions from the
2019 term—Bostock v. Clayton County237 and June Medical Services v.
Russo238—both resulted from a special RHP setup. This is the type of setup
where the “rock” argument is (as usual) the winning argument, and the
“hard place” alternative is a theory of jurisprudence that relevant justices
wish to avoid.239
In Bostock, the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, by prohibiting employment discrimination “because of . . . sex,”240
prohibits discrimination because of employees’ sexual orientation and
gender identity.241 Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, recognized
that if employers draw distinctions on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity, they are necessarily drawing them on the basis of sex. His
opinion can largely be boiled down to the following statement: “[I]magine
an applicant doesn’t know what the words homosexual or transgender
mean. Then try writing out instructions for who should check the box
without using the words man, woman, or sex (or some synonym).
It can’t be done.”242
Whether incensed or exuberant, Americans were largely shocked that
a conservative-leaning Supreme Court ruled in favor of LGBT rights.243
But as LGBT advocate Chase Strangio explained, the petitioners had
briefed the case to elicit Justice Gorsuch’s precise reasoning244—reasoning
grounded in a strict adherence to textualism.245 Numerous scholars have
claimed that textualism was not necessary to reach the outcome in
Bostock.246 There were very strong arguments based on McLaughlin v.
Florida247 and Loving v. Virginia:248 arguments that prohibitions on samesex marriage discriminate based on sex, just as laws prohibiting interracial
237. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
238. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2108 (2020).
239. See supra Section III.A and text accompanying note 188.
240. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
241. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1756.
242. Id. at 1746.
243. See, e.g., Jane Coaston, Social Conservatives Feel Betrayed by the Supreme Court — and
the GOP that Appointed It, VOX (July 1, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/7/1/21293370/supremecourt-conservatism-bostock-lgbtq-republicans [https://perma.cc/EKM5-TFNV].
244. 2020 Bingo Card, STRICT SCRUTINY: THE APPEAL (June 22, 2020), https://strictscrutiny.simplecast.com/episodes/2020-bingo-card [https://perma.cc/CZ6S-85YD].
245. Jonathan Skrmetti, Symposium: The Triumph of Textualism: “Only the Written Word Is the
Law,” SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2020), scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-the-triumph-oftextualism-only-the-written-word-is-the-law/ [https://perma.cc/DU9H-3ZCP].
246. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Does Justice Gorsuch’s Magnificent Opinion in the Title VII
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Cases Redeem Textualism?, DORF ON LAW (June 16, 2020),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2020/06/does-justice-gorsuchs-magnificent.html [https://perma.cc/ZM7KMT2X].
247. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
248. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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cohabitation and marriage discriminate on the basis of race.249 Likewise,
there is a very strong argument that LGBT-discrimination is unlawful sex
stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.250
By focusing, however, on textualist arguments, the petitioners
established a hard place for justices who adhere religiously to textualism.
The constructive dilemma was as follows: If (A) the Court adheres to the
plain meaning of Title VII’s language, then (C) Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of LGBT status. If (B) the Court does not
adhere to a textualist approach, then (D) textualism is not the logical and
neutral form of interpretation that its proponents purport it to be. Some
justices, of course, rejected the premise of this dilemma and asserted that
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion was not, in fact, a textualist interpretation.251
But for Justice Gorsuch, the strictest textualist on the Court, the merits of
the case did fundamentally pit his social conservative bent against his
principles of judicial review. His questions during oral argument revealed
his struggle with the dilemma of whether to look beyond the text:
When a case is really close, really close, on the textual evidence, and
I—assume for the moment I’m . . . with you on the textual
evidence. . . . The judge finds it very close. At the end of the day,
should he or she take into consideration the massive social upheaval
that would be entailed in such a decision, and the possibility that—
that Congress didn’t think about it[?]252

Ultimately unwilling to forego his textualist principles and leave his
tenets of judicial review open to attack, Justice Gorsuch authored the
opinion on behalf of himself, the Chief Justice, and the four liberal justices
on the Court.253
A similar RHP dilemma motivated Chief Justice Roberts’s ruling in
June Medical Services.254 In that case, abortion providers challenged a
Louisiana statute that required all physicians performing abortions to have
hospital admitting privileges within thirty miles of their clinic.255 The
249. See Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination,
98 YALE L.J. 145, 148 (1988); see also Andrew Koppelman, Bostock v. Clayton County, ORAL
ARGUMENT 2.0 (Oct. 8, 2019), https://argument2.oyez.org/2019/bostock-v-clayton-county/ [https://
perma.cc/N6S5-AZDP].
250. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
251. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1755–56 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It
sails under a textualist flag, but what it actually represents is a theory of statutory interpretation that
Justice Scalia excoriated . . . .”).
252. Oral Argument at 22:18, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm’n, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 18-107) (consolidated with Bostock, 140 S. Ct.
1731 (No. 17-1618)), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-107 [https://perma.cc/QJ5X-CCEY].
253. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
254. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2108 (2020).
255. Id. at 2112.
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physicians argued that the statute placed an undue burden on a woman’s
right to seek an abortion because most abortion providers do not have (or
need) hospital admitting privileges, and requiring them to obtain these
privileges would have the practical impact of shutting down almost every
clinic in Louisiana.256 Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, the Fifth
Circuit had reversed the district court and upheld the admitting-privileges
requirement as constitutional.257 Many pro-choice liberals feared that the
conservative majority on the Supreme Court would side with the Fifth
Circuit and significantly undercut the protections that Roe v. Wade
famously guaranteed to women.258
Starting with the first sentence of their brief, the petitioners largely
focused their argument on stare decisis.259 They characterized the Fifth
Circuit’s ruling as contumacious, given that just four years prior, the
Supreme Court had struck down an identical admitting-privileges
requirement in Texas.260 The petitioners argued that if the Court failed to
respect its Whole Woman’s Health holding from just four years prior, the
decision would significantly undermine the integrity of the Court as an
institution. In constructive dilemma terms, the petitioners asserted that
either (A) the Court follows its recent holding in Whole Woman’s Health,
and (C) Louisiana’s admitting-privileges requirement is unconstitutional;
or (B) the Court refuses to follow its four-year-old precedent in Whole
Woman’s Health and (D) proves that the Court simply acts along partisan
lines irrespective of precedent.
As they did in Bostock, several justices rejected the premise of the
constructive dilemma. Here, they argued that June Medical and Whole
Woman’s Health were distinguishable cases.261 The respondents in June
Medical argued that the undue burden analysis is fact-specific and
therefore must proceed case-by-case, and several dissenting justices in
June Medical, latching onto this reasoning, concluded that the factual

256. Id.
257. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 815 (5th Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom. June
Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. 2103.
258. See Melissa Murray, Party of Five? Setting the Table for Roe v. Wade, SCOTUSBLOG (July
24, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/symposium-party-of-five-setting-the-table-for-roev-wade/ [https://perma.cc/DN9K-8RNQ].
259. Response & Reply Brief for Petitioners-Cross-Respondents at 1, June Med. Servs. L.L.C.,
140 S. Ct. 2103 (Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460) (“The State disregards stare decisis at every turn.”).
260. Id.; see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
261. June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2157 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is a major
theme in the plurality opinion and that of THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Both opinions try to create the
impression that this case is the same as Whole Woman’s Health and that stare decisis therefore
commands the same result. In truth, however, the two cases are very different.” (capitalization in
original)).
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scenario was different in Louisiana than it had been in Texas.262 But the
Chief Justice has, since his confirmation hearing, asserted the importance
of maintaining the integrity of the judiciary.263 Therefore, just as forsaking
textualist principles was a hard place for Justice Gorsuch, undermining an
impartial judiciary proved to be a legitimate hard place for the Chief
Justice. In his concurring opinion, he provided the fifth vote to overturn
Louisiana’s admitting-privileges requirement, noting that the case too
closely resembled Whole Woman’s Health to rule otherwise.264
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR MISSION-DRIVEN PLAINTIFFS AND CONCLUDING
THOUGHTS
In this final Part, we suggest two additional areas of law in which
RHP arguments may prove particularly effective for mission-driven
plaintiffs, and we provide examples in each context. The first is in the
context of administrative law, where an agency must both justify a
regulatory decision by asserting it has economic benefits and downplay
the negative externalities of the decision—regardless of whether the
externalities fall on minority populations, the environment, animals, or any
other underrepresented interest. These competing duties create the perfect
opportunity for plaintiffs to employ RHP arguments because, when trying
to justify their actions, agencies often make statements that plaintiffs can
use against them. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) case
from Section III.B provides one such example.
While NRDC’s RHP argument was used to overcome a standing
hurdle, plaintiffs can use a similar strategy to win on the merits.265
262. Id.
263. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005) (opening
statement by then-Judge John Roberts) (“I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and
not to pitch or bat.”).
264. June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The Louisiana law
imposes a burden on access to abortion just as severe as that imposed by the Texas law, for the same
reasons. Therefore, Louisiana’s law cannot stand under our precedents.”). One of us has argued
elsewhere that the Chief Justice’s concurrence in June Medical left a roadmap for states to follow
when seeking to restrict a woman’s right to seek abortion, but the fact remains that June Medical was
an important victory for pro-choice liberals. Jareb Gleckel, What Chief Justice Roberts’s June Medical
Concurrence Tells Us About the Future of Abortion, JUSTIA: VERDICT (June 30, 2020),
https://verdict.justia.com/2020/06/30/what-chief-justice-robertss-june-medical-concurrence-tells-usabout-the-future-of-abortion [https://perma.cc/R99L-BSAR].
265. We can describe the RHP argument employed in NRDC v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior in the
following simplified form: either (A) the agency action affects birds, and the plaintiffs have standing
or (B) the agency action is unjustified. See supra Section III.B. The arguments we will propose in this
section operate similarly: either (A) the agency action affects the environment, and the plaintiffs
prevail on a National Environmental Policy Act claim or (B) the agency action is unjustified. In both
cases, the agency is cornered by its attempts to explain and justify its actions. In NRDC, this prevents
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Specifically, a plaintiff can pair a National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)266 claim as a rock with an “arbitrary [and] capricious”267
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim as a hard place—particularly
where the agency has failed to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS).268 Consider the example of the Forest Service’s (FS) recent
Proposed Rule on Oil and Gas Resources, which would amend existing
regulations to streamline the process of oil and gas leasing on National
Forest lands.269 If the FS follows through with its proposal, environmental
organizations are likely to challenge the Rule as violating NEPA. These
organizations could argue that the FS should have prepared an EIS because
the changes “accelerat[e] new drilling in national forests” and thereby may
have the significant environmental impacts of “worsen[ing] the climate
crisis and hurt[ing] public health by further polluting our air and water.”270
The agency would likely respond to such an argument by claiming that it
does not expect the changes to accelerate drilling.271 However, if
environmental organizations also make the “hard place” argument that the
FS’s changes are arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA, they can
corner the agency. The overall rationale that the FS gives for its proposed
changes is that they “modernize existing procedures to streamline
processes and promote efficiency.”272 By arguing that the FS’s economic
explanation is conclusory and not supported by evidence, plaintiffs could
force the agency to articulate, on the record, how the changes “streamline”
and increase efficiency and why that matters. Such a challenge is colorable
because the FS did an exceedingly poor job of explaining its exact reasons

the agency from dismissing the case for lack of standing; in the scenarios we propose, this allows the
plaintiffs to prevail on a claim on the merits.
266. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
267. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
268. NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS for all major actions that may
significantly impact the environment, including amendments to regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40
C.F.R. § 1502.3 (2020).
269. Oil & Gas Resources, 85 Fed. Reg. 54,311, 54,311 (proposed Sept. 1, 2020).
270. Press Release, Emily Deanne & Anne Hawke, Nat. Res. Def. Council, Administration
Relaxes Rules for Oil and Gas Drilling in National Forests (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.nrdc.org/media/2020/200831 [https://perma.cc/X23C-7T8D]. We believe the Natural
Resources Defense Council, an environmental nonprofit, would be a likely key player in the legal fight
against the Proposed Rule if it is finalized. See id.
271. See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR PROPOSED RULE TO REVISE
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 36 C.F.R. PART 228, SUBPART E: OIL AND GAS RESOURCES 35
(2019) (reasoning that “[t]he Forest Service does not expect that the regulatory revisions will drive a
notable increase or decrease in the number of leases or in the rate at which lands are nominated for
lease by the oil and gas industry,” inter alia, to conclude that the Proposed Rule would have no
significant environmental impacts and that, therefore, no EIS was needed).
272. Oil & Gas Resources, 85 Fed. Reg. at 53,411.
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for certain changes.273 But more importantly, if the agency articulates its
“efficiency” reasoning, it will likely have to admit that it expects the
changes to accelerate drilling projects, undermining its defense to the
NEPA claim.274 In other words, the real value of the APA claim is in how
it would serve as a hard place, forcing the agency to undermine its NEPA
argument by articulating its belief that the regulatory changes would
actually have an effect.
This type of RHP argument could also work well in challenges to
regulatory changes meant to benefit hunters or fishermen. Such changes
are designed to make it easier for sportsmen to kill wildlife, yet
government agencies often argue that they will not affect wildlife
populations and therefore do not need to be assessed in an EIS.275
273. Certain unexplained parts of the Proposed Rule (e.g., the removal of public notice and
comment opportunities) look suspiciously like concessions to industry at the expense of the public.
See Katherine Rogers & Grace Brosofsky, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Oil and Gas
Resources 4 (Nov. 2, 2020), https://beta.regulations.gov/comment/FS-2020-0007-3786 [https://
perma.cc/R6R5-JCVQ] (“Here, the Forest Service avoided providing any explanation for (or even
acknowledgment of) the proposed rule’s removal of public notice and comment opportunities in 36
C.F.R. § 228.107. In its [cursory] discussion of its proposed amendments to § 228.107, the
FS . . . [gave] the misleading impression that the agency planned only to reorganize the section of code
without making any substantive changes” to what the section required).
274. The agency almost undeniably does intend to accelerate drilling, and the phrase “streamline
processes and promote efficiency” is a fairly transparent euphemism for this motive. See
Memorandum from Sonny Perdue, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., to Victoria Christiansen, Chief, U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Forest Serv. 1 (June 12, 2020), https://www.fs.usda.gov/sites/default/files/202006/secretarial_memo_national_grasslands.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AX4-X8WP] (describing the need
to “provide relief from burdensome regulations, improve customer service, and boost the productivity
of our National Forests and Grasslands” by “streamlin[ing] processes and identify[ing] new
opportunities to increase America’s energy dominance and reduce reliance on foreign countries for
critical minerals”). Comment letters written by industry groups make it apparent that oil and gas
companies recognize this and also believe that the Proposed Rule will help them to conduct more
drilling on federal lands at a faster rate. See, e.g., Tripp Parks, Vice President, Gov’t Affs., W. Energy
All., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Oil and Gas Resources 1 (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://www.westernenergyalliance.org/uploads/1/3/1/2/131273598/western_energy_alliance_comm
ents_on_the_usfs_oil_and_gas_resources_regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z32N-TMNN] (“Delays
caused by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process discourage Alliance members from
operating on USFS lands, thereby reducing revenues that would be generated for the federal
government and limiting domestic energy production. . . . We greatly appreciate that U.S. Department
of Agriculture Secretary Sonny Perdue understands the need to reduce these delays . . . .”).
275. Compare, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Secretary Bernhardt Proposes Historic
Expansion of Hunting and Fishing Opportunities (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/
secretary-bernhardt-proposes-historic-expansion-hunting-and-fishing-opportunities
[https://perma.cc/ZF67-6NPK] (“‘America’s hunters and anglers now have something significant to
look forward to in the fall as we plan to open and expand hunting and fishing opportunities across
more acreage nationwide than the entire state of Delaware,’ said Secretary Bernhardt. ‘The U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service’s Hunt Fish Chiefs have been instrumental in our effort over the past two years
to streamline our regulations and identify new opportunities for sportsmen and women like no other
previous administration.’”), with 2020–2021 Station-Specific Hunting and Sport Fishing Regulations,
85 Fed. Reg. 20,030, 20,044 (proposed Apr. 9, 2020) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts 32, 36, and 71)
(declining to perform NEPA analysis of the cumulative impacts of the same changes that the agency
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Environmental and animal rights plaintiffs would do well to capitalize on
this tension by arguing that either the decision is arbitrary and capricious,
or the decision has environmental impacts that the agency must assess.
A second area of law in which RHP arguments may work especially
well is the First Amendment context, particularly when it is unclear how
much speech the government intends to restrict. In these cases, if plaintiffs
challenge a government regulation as unconstitutional because it imposes
on free speech, they may do well to couple their First Amendment claim
with a claim that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to
give “people ‘of common intelligence’ fair notice of what the law demands
of them.”276 To illustrate the efficacy of this type of argument, consider
state statutes prohibiting companies from “[m]isrepresenting . . . a product
as meat that is not derived from harvested production livestock or
poultry.”277 These statutes target the marketing of plant-based meat
alternatives, such as Tofurky deli slices and the Impossible Whopper at
Burger King, which use strictly plant-based ingredients to replicate the
taste and texture of animal products.278 Companies making plant-based
products fear that they will be liable for using words like “meat” or
“burger” on their labels to describe their products, and some states, like
Arkansas, make this prohibition explicit.279 Other states, however, like
Missouri, have been less explicit and have unofficially backed off of this

had referred to as a “historic expansion” in its press release); compare Press Release, U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., Proposed Public Use Regulations Improve Hunting, Fishing and Recreation Access
(May 20, 2020), https://www.fws.gov/news/ShowNews.cfm?ref=proposed-public-use-regulationsimprove-hunting-fishing-and-recreation-&_ID=36564 [https://perma.cc/3FC7-4L65] (describing the
decision to allow brown-bear baiting in order to “increas[e] opportunities for consumptive use[,]” inter
alia), with FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR AMENDMENT OF
PUBLIC USE REGULATIONS AT KENAI NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE 25 (June 11, 2020) (concluding
that an EIS did not need to be prepared because “[i]t is unknown what impact, if any, the allowance
of hunting of brown bear over bait would have on the population trend”).
276. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2325 (2019) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
277. MO. REV. STAT. § 265.494(7) (2018). A number of states have passed (or at least proposed)
statutes with similar language. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(6) (2019) (prohibiting
“[r]epresenting the agricultural product as meat or a meat product when the agricultural product is not
derived from harvested livestock, poultry, or cervids”); see also Lauren Handel, New State Laws
Restrict “Meat” Labeling for Cell-Cultured and Plant-Based Products, HANDEL FOOD L. (June 21,
2019), https://www.handelfoodlaw.com/labeling/new-state-laws-restrict-meat-labeling-for-cellcultured-and-plant-based-products/ [https://perma.cc/7LFB-7E9U] (listing statutes).
278. See Jareb A. Gleckel & Sherry F. Colb, The Meaning of Meat, 26 ANIMAL L. 75, 78 (2020).
279. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(10) (2019) (prohibiting companies from “[u]tilizing a term that
is the same or similar to a term that has been used or defined historically in reference to a specific
agricultural product”). We note that Arkansas’s statute may be unconstitutionally vague in different
respects.
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position, claiming instead that if companies make adequate disclosures
that their products are vegan, they will not face liability.280
In several states, plant-based companies are challenging these
statutes as violating their First Amendment rights.281 A First Amendment
claim alone was enough to procure a preliminary injunction in Arkansas,
where the state left the court with little doubt of how aggressively it would
implement the statute.282 But in states where the nature of the prohibitions
is less explicit, pairing First Amendment challenges with vagueness
challenges will likely prove beneficial. Vagueness challenges not only add
value on their own merit, but also help to flush out free speech restrictions,
thereby teeing up plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims. More specifically,
when plant-based companies challenge a statute as unconstitutionally
vague, the state must respond that the statute is clear—either because it
prohibits the use of words like “meat” and “burger” or because it does not.
If it does not, the statute does not have teeth because almost all vegan
products contain disclosures that they are vegan, and when the products
include such disclosures, they do not confuse consumers.283 If the statute
does prohibit the use of specific words, then the statute very likely violates
the First Amendment.284
These examples are, of course, not meant to be exhaustive. Beyond
providing specific litigation strategies, this Article aims to motivate
mission-driven plaintiffs to seek out RHP arguments in their own cases.
For centuries, RHP dilemmas have operated to the detriment of criminal
defendants and mission-driven plaintiffs alike. Our goal has been to shed
light on these dilemmas and then to highlight scenarios in which brilliant
lawyers have turned the tables. We hope our Article encourages and
facilitates the continuation of that practice.

280. See Sherry F. Colb & Jareb A. Gleckel, Dear Big Ag: We Don’t Trust Your Motives, DORF
LAW (June 14, 2019), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2019/06/dear-big-ag-we-dont-trust-yourmotives.html [https://perma.cc/VN8N-QPXE] (discussing how the Missouri Department of
Agriculture has issued statements to cabin the statutory language).
281. See, e.g., Preliminary Injunction Order, Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp.
3d 552 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-00514-KGB) (challenging Arkansas law).
282. See Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552 (E.D. Ark. 2019).
283. See Jareb A. Gleckel, Are Consumers Really Confused By Plant-Based Food Labels? An
Empirical Study, 12 J. ANIMAL & ENV’T L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2) (on file with
authors).
284. See Turtle Island Foods, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552.
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